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BARRING INTELLIGENT DESIGN FROM
PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL INQUIRY
RUSSELL F. PANNIER, ESQ. * AND THOMAS D. SULLIVAN, PH.D.**
INTRODUCTION
Should educators be allowed to teach intelligent design in public
schools? Some say, "Obviously not!" Intelligent design is the idea that a
supernatural intelligence is responsible for the apparent design in nature; it
is not genuine science. Intelligent design is religion, and religion should be
kept out of public schools. Common sense and the Constitution of the
United States require this.
Others say, "Obviously yes!" A single theory should not be jammed
down students' throats. It is an affront to common sense that a viable
theory, supported by secular reasoning, should be concealed from students.
Furthermore, the Constitution is silent concerning which arguments can and
cannot be brought up in public schools. Tendentious constitutional
interpretation is all that precludes teaching intelligent design in public
schools at this time.
There is merit to both responses. In this essay, we will offer our own,
but before we do, it is important to remember the observation of the great
twentieth- century philosopher G.E. Moore. Moore noted that people often
do not succeed in philosophical inquiry because they fail to clarify the
meaning of the question to be answered.1 Therefore, we will select an
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affirmative claim and consider what propositions it might express.
To avoid repetition, we will designate this affirmative claim as "thesis
T". Thesis T reads, "Educators may teach intelligent design in public school
classes." This claim can represent many distinct propositions. To clarify the
issue, this essay will separate the propositions about thesis T that have been
fused together in the literature.
A major problem with discussions of intelligent design is that it is
difficult to address the issue without generating an emotional response.
Many arguments on this issue are burdened by accounts of fundamentalist
Christian opposition to evolution (e.g., Genesis is literally true), false
dichotomies (e.g., creationism is not science; it is religion), and angry
denunciations (e.g., "Fraud!"). As a result, we will do our best to offer a fair
examination of the main philosophical and legal issues and explore
neglected lines of reasoning. We hope that our efforts will provide a better
understanding of the available logical space behind thesis T.
What is at stake in the intelligent design debate? Many argue that if
intelligent design theory is allowed into science classes, the quality of
public school education in the United States will be jeopardized. Others say
that solid science education requires setting opposing hypotheses before
students so that they can make up their own minds. In truth, though,
something deeper worries those who consider this matter. The subtitle of
evolutionary biologist Kenneth R. Miller's Only a Theory: Evolution and
the Battle for America's Soul puts the worries in dramatic terms that
resonate with religion.'
If evolutionary theory is taught in such a way as to assert or imply that
human beings are thoroughly physical entities whose bodies and faculties
can be explained in purely naturalistic terms, the consequences will be
enormous. Recipients of a thoroughgoing naturalistic instruction will see
that certain forms of naturalistic thought require a complete revising of our
conception of God. There would be no place for a teleological argument for
God's existence like the watch-maker argument made so famous by the
Rev. Paley.3 And should students fail to grasp this, denigrators of revelation
like Daniel Dennett stand at their side eager to correct each wayward
thought. Dennett proclaims:
The kindly God who lovingly fashioned each and every one of us
(all creatures great and small) and sprinkled the sky with shining
stars for our delight-that God is, like Santa Claus, the myth of
childhood not anything a sane, undeluded adult could literally
2. KENNETH R. MILLER, ONLY A THEORY: EVOLUTION AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S
SOUL (2008).
3. See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (2006).
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believe in. That God must either be turned into a symbol for
something less concrete or abandoned altogether.4
Nor is it only conceptions about God, the supernatural providential
agent, which need revising. The consequences of evolutionary naturalism
worry even some evolutionary naturalists. Kim Sterelny puts it this way:
One major movement of the twentieth- century philosophy has been
naturalism: seeing humans as wholly part of the natural world. In
turn, naturalism generates a difficult philosophical problem: to what
extent is our ordinary common commonsensical picture of
ourselves and of our world compatible with the fact that we are
nothing more than complex evolved biochemical machines?
Commonsense views humans as agents: we are self-aware;
deliberative makers of real choices; reflective; often rational; and
aware of moral considerations and sometimes responsive to them.
Perhaps this picture is undermined by an evolutionary perspective
that sees us as gene replicating machines : as vehicles built by and
for genes. What could choice, rationality, a morality be but illusions
if that is the truth about us?5
What indeed? Naturalists such as Dennett seek to reassure us that we still
make real choices; however, Dennett's assurances are badly undercut by his
frequent eliminativist declarations that we have no psychological states at
all. Other Neo-Darwinians bite the bullet with respect to freedom and
morality. For Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, for example, ethical truth is
an illusion.6 Who could expect even half-alert students to walk away from a
course in evolutionary biology with anything but deep doubts about who
and what they are and whether there could be any god who cares?
Naturalistic instruction threatens to diminish respect for certain world-
views coloring ideas of what should be taught in public schools. This is
because defenders of intelligent design in the classroom are often motivated
by theistic world-views. But, it cannot be denied that some opponents of
teaching intelligent design are motivated by a strong attachment to a world-
view of the sort offered by geneticist Richard Lewontin:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some
of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its
extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of
the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because
we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism ....
Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a
4. DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARwIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA 18 (1995).
5. Kim Sterelny, Philosophy of Evolutionary Thought, in EvOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR
BILLION YEARS 313,321 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis eds., 2009).
6. Id.
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Divine Foot in the door.7
Despite the fact that world-views are threatened, emotional engagement
should not prevent an honest investigation of thesis T.
This entire debate would be moot if a warranted consensus existed in
the scientific community that the world, including all the organisms within
it, is a physically closed system comprehensively explained by Neo-
Darwinism. Such a consensus does not exist, though a high percentage of
the scientific academy's most prestigious theorists may believe that Neo-
Darwinism leaves no mystery that requires an appeal to supernatural forces.
A major reason no such consensus has been formed-let alone been
announced-is that the data that perplexed both Darwin and Wallace
continues to dumbfound theorists today, particularly in the philosophical
community.
It may be protested that despite our professed aim to be fair and precise,
we have already muddied the waters and then stirred them up. One might
object that we have merged Neo-Darwinian thought with a materialist view
of the world; they are distinguishable. Logic requires that one should not
confuse, as we just did, methodological atheism with metaphysical atheism.
Methodological atheism is merely the scientific commitment to natural
explanations of all natural processes. Metaphysical atheism is the doctrine,
which individual scientists may or may not hold, that there is nothing
beyond the natural to invoke.'
We answer that there certainly is a difference between a methodology
that does not appeal to supernatural causality and a methodology that
presupposes an atheistic metaphysics. It is not at all clear that this
distinction can be applied to Neo-Darwinism. This is one of the issues we
will investigate. At the moment, we are positing that it certainly looks to
many people that Neo-Darwinism, as typically expounded, either
presupposes or entails a physicalistic outlook. This raises important
questions about what kind of god we can accept9 and about what kind of
being raises such important questions. ° Whether or not Neo-Darwinism
carries the imagined implications, the fear that it does is enough to make the
issues raised in this essay of great concern.
At this point, one might be tempted to dismiss anxieties about world-
7. Richard Lewontin, Billions and Billions of Demons, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Jan. 9, 1997 (reviewing CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN
THE DARK (1995)).
8. Nancy Murphy, Philip Johnson on Trial: A Critique of His Critique on Darwinism, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN: SCIENCE OR RELIGION 181, 194 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum
eds., 2006).
9. See PALEY, supra note 3.
10. See DENNETT, supra note 4.
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views as sheer confusion about the relationship between religion and
science. Such a person might argue that it is only when people-irreligious
as well as religious-treat Genesis like a science textbook that we wind up
with conflict. If only these literalists could understand that there are "two
magisteria"--one a scientific structure of the world and the other a religion
of values-they would see that there cannot be conflict. "
We answer that while we are not among those who read Genesis
literally or doubt species have evolved, we nonetheless believe that there
are very considerable grounds for worrying about conflict. The two
magisteria conception of the relation between science and religion is
impossible to sustain without arbitrarily shrinking the set of propositions
held by believers. One may smile indulgently at the naivet6 of biblical
literalists with their preposterous estimates of the age of the earth and
explanations of the geological record, but what gives anyone the right to
declare that their beliefs are not religious? Biblical literalists sincerely
believe that God has revealed propositions at variance with that what
modem science teaches. Why exactly does this soulful adhesion to some
putatively revealed propositions not count as religious?
Since this is a Catholic legal journal, it is fitting to turn to Roman
Catholic geneticist Francisco Ayala's treatment of the two magisteria.
Ayala cites popes and other religious figures to the effect that evolution is
an acceptable doctrine. 2 He points out that Pope John Paul II refers to
evolution as "a fact" in his 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences. 3 Unfortunately, Ayala's analysis is unhelpful because he
overlooks much in the address that runs contrary to the notion that religion
and science treat different subjects. Religion and science do treat the same
subject: the metaphysics of the human person. The very subtitle of the
address suggests such an overlap: "Magisterium is Concerned with [the]
Question of Evolution for it Involves [a] Conception of Man.""
In the body of the address, John Paul II endorses the pronouncements of
Pope Pius XII concerning the immortality of human souls. 5 John Paul II's
teachings are so rich on the subject and so definite in their insistence that
the magisterium of the Church can definitively teach things about human
11. Stephen Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND ITS
CRITICs 737 (Robert Pennock ed., 2001).
12. FRANcisco J. AYALA, DARWIN AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 90-96 (2006).
13. Id.
14. Pope John Paul II, Message to the Pontifical Academy of Science: On Evolution (Oct. 22,
1996), available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/p961022.htm.
15. Pope Pius XI I, Humanae Generis: Encyclical Concerning Some False Opinions
Threatening to Undermine the Foundations of Catholic Doctrine 36 (Aug. 12, 1950), available
at http://www.made-inbet.net/holyfather/pius-xii/encyclicals/documents/hf p-xii enc
12081950_humani-generis en.html.
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nature that the entire text is worth reading:
5. The magisterium of the Church takes a direct interest in the
question of evolution because it touches on the conception of man,
whom Revelation tells us is created in the image and likeness of
God. The conciliar constitution "Gaudium et Spes" has given us a
magnificent exposition of this doctrine, which is one of the
essential elements of Christian thought. The Council recalled that
"man is the only creature on earth that God wanted for its own
sake." In other words, the human person cannot be subordinated as
a means to an end, or as an instrument of either the species or the
society; he has a value of his own. He is a person. By this
intelligence and his will, he is capable of entering into relationship,
of communion, of solidarity, of the gift of himself to others like
himself. St. Thomas observed that man's resemblance to God
resides especially in his speculative intellect, because his
relationship with the object of his knowledge is like God's
relationship with his creation. (Summa Theologica I-II, q 3, a 5, ad
1). But even beyond that, man is called to enter into a loving
relationship with God himself, a relationship which will find its full
expression at the end of time, in eternity. Within the mystery of the
risen Christ, the full grandeur of this vocation is revealed to us.
(Gaudium et Spes, 22). It is by virtue of his eternal soul that the
whole person, including his body, possesses such great dignity.
Pius XII underlined the essential point: if the origin of the human
body comes through living matter which existed previously, the
spiritual soul is created directly by God ("animas enim a Deo
immediate creari catholica fides non retimere iubet"). (Humanae
Generis). As a result, the theories of evolution which, because of
the philosophies which inspire them, regard the spirit either as
emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a simple
epiphenomenon of that matter, are incompatible with the truth
about man. They are therefore unable to serve as the basis for the
dignity of the human person.
6. With man, we find ourselves facing a different ontological
order-an ontological leap, we could say. 6
Thus, we see how mistaken Catholics and others are in thinking that what
we are about to discuss is a tempest in a teapot. Not only pitifully
misguided biblical literalism runs the risk of colliding with evolutionary
theory but so does the magisterium of the Catholic Church.
This is a mere introduction to the complex issues surrounding thesis T.
16. Pope John Paul II, supra note 14.
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The essay is broken into two parts. Part I investigates the philosophical
issues surrounding thesis T. Part II investigates the constitutional issues
raised by thesis T. Though each part has a distinct focus, the essay forms a
unit because the philosophical conclusions of Part I are assumed in Part IL
PART I
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
The philosophical issues surrounding thesis T are ambiguously dealt
with in books, articles, and court judgments. Therefore, the first step is to
clarify the propositions incorporated in thesis T, thereby determining the
logical space behind it. The second step is to distinguish the plausible
responses to thesis T and build arguments for each response. Having
addressed the philosophical issues, we will be in a position to move on to
Part II and address the legal issues raised by thesis T.
I. Clarifying the Propositions Incorporated in Thesis T.
According to Moore, the first step in philosophical analysis is clarifying
the propositions that can be affixed to a particular sentence.' 7 To see what
propositions thesis T could be used to represent, it is necessary to parse its
constituent terms. In the case of thesis T, we will examine the terms
"intelligent design," "teach," "public school classes," and "may." Such
tasks are seldom exhilarating, but the effort will pay dividends.
1. There is a difference between "intelligent design" and the case for
"intelligent design."
It is important to distinguish between a proposition and the epistemic
backing for it, what might be called a "case." A "case" is the evidence
offered for the proposition as grounds for believing it. Often the terms
"intelligent design" or "intelligent design theory" are used in ways that
obscure this distinction. So, where we are not quoting others, we will
reserve the term "intelligent design" for ideas about the role of supernatural
intelligence in the world. We will use "case" to refer to the evidence for the
claims of intelligent design. Drawing this distinction between intelligent
design and case immediately opens up alternatives - logical space. One
might say, for example, "I certainly think it's permissible to say a word or
two about the meaning of the idea that the world is intelligently designed,
but teachers should not take up arguments for and against this thesis." Each
time a distinction is drawn, more logical space is opened up.
17. MOORE, supra note 1.
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a. The phrase "intelligent design" can have a variety of
meanings.
The phrase "intelligent design" has never represented a unified theory.
The original distinctions are best displayed in the under-reported dispute
between the two co-creators of the theory of evolution: Alfred Wallace and
Charles Darwin. Wallace was the first person to present a paper to the
learned world on the theory of evolution by natural selection. Wallace
stunned Darwin by asking his opinion of a paper that Wallace had written
on descent with modification by natural selection.'8 Dismayed by the
realization that Wallace had independently worked out the theory of natural
selection, Darwin thought he was in danger of losing credit for more than
twenty years of work. Despite this setback, Darwin eventually published the
world-changing Origin of Species followed by The Descent of Man.
In his books, particularly The Descent of Man, Darwin argues that blind
physical processes are the sole efficient causes of the character and
operational capacities of the human species. But Wallace was not
convinced. He was having deep doubts about what the theory of natural
selection could explain. 9 These doubts were not inspired by Christian
revelation; rather, Wallace's doubts were caused by a class of phenomena-
certain physical and mental features of human beings-manifested in
different places and epochs. Wallace confessed,
[T]his theory has the advantage of requiring the intervention of
some distinct individual intelligence, to aid in the production of
what we can hardly avoid considering as the ultimate aim and
outcome of all organized existence - intellectual, ever-advancing
spiritual man. It therefore implies, that the great laws which govern
the material universe were insufficient for his production, unless we
consider (as we may fairly do) that the controlling action of such
higher intelligence is a necessary part of those laws."
Dumbfounded by this confession, Darwin wrote to Wallace, "I hope you
have not murdered too completely your own and my child."'" Despite their
apparent disagreement, Darwin's own writings suggest a willingness to
accept intelligent design:
I am aware that the conclusions arrived at in this work will be
denounced by some as highly irreligious; but he who thus
denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious to
18. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, ON THE TENDENCY OF VARIETIES TO DEPART
INDEFINITELY FROM THE ORIGINAL TYPE (1858).
19. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, in
INFINITE TROPICS: AN ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE ANTHOLOGY 175 (Andrew Berry ed., 2002).
20. Id., at 208-09.
21. RICHARD MILNER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EvOLUTION 457 (1993).
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explain the origin of man as a distinct species by descent from some
lower form through laws of variation and natural selection, than to
explain the birth of an individual through laws of ordinary
reproduction. The birth both of the species and of the individual are
equally parts of that grand sequence of events, which our minds
refuse to accept the result of blind chance. The understanding
revolts at such a conclusion... 22
What, then, is to be made of all this? Wallace and Darwin clearly had
different reasons for rejecting the supremacy of chance in creation. Wallace
recognized a need for the interventions of a supernatural intelligence
guiding the unfolding of nature. Unlike Wallace, Darwin recoiled at the
idea of a supernatural intelligence supplementing natural processes. Darwin
wrote to Wallace, "I can see no necessity for calling in an additional and
proximate cause in regard to man."23 To Darwin, Wallace's ideas about the
limits of natural selection were heresy. The conflict between Wallace and
Darwin highlights the need for clarity about the issue of teaching intelligent
design in public schools. It also raises the hope that once thesis T is
disambiguated, agreement can be reached based on the logical space
uncovered.
Let us take a cue from how Wallace and Darwin frame their ideas and
set out the two basic arguments. First, there is the notion-let us call it
"Darwinian intelligent design"-that a supernatural intelligence operating
outside the universe set things up so that human beings and other organisms
came to be in much the form we find them now. This intelligence neither
did nor does disturb the unfolding of nature. 4 The second idea-let us call
it "Wallacian intelligent design"-is that a supernatural being created the
universe to follow set rules, but it also took steps along the way to guide the
processes to given ends. The intelligent designer is more than a mere
designer or creator of the world. It brings about effects that nature would
not or could not produce alone.
The proposition that the intelligent being acts is consistent with
Darwinian intelligent design. The god-like Darwinian designer acted by
building a physical world in accordance with the plan. The only difference
is that it does not interfere with the workings of nature. This consistency
opens up logical space upon which rational discussion and agreement can
be based.
22. CHARLES DARWIN, The Descent of Man, in FROM SO SIMPLE BEGINNING: THE FOUR
GREAT BOOKS OF CHARLES DARWIN 1242 (E.O. Wilson ed., 2006).
23. See MILNER, supra note 21, at 457.
24. Darwin rejects the idea that God's action is necessary as a proximate cause for the
generation of human beings. It is unclear whether he also rejects the traditional Christian idea that
God's action is required to sustain things in this world.
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b. The Case for Intelligent Design.
The case for intelligent design refers to the evidence offered in support
of intelligent design. As one might expect, the evidence varies, as does the
reasoning in which it is used. Beliefs about intelligent design held by
religious people are often assumed to be ungrounded; they have no case.
This is almost never true. Anyone who says, "I believe we were
intelligently designed because ... (fill in the blank)" gives grounds for his
belief. The grounds for such religious belief are typically authoritative,
based on revelation. That by itself means some grounds are offered; a case
has been presented. 5 A case based on divine sources cannot be summarily
dismissed.
The contrast between faith and science is all too crude if the only
distinction it is supposed to draw is between rationally ungrounded and
grounded positions. A better contrast arises from the distinction between
grounds that include a reference to a divine source of hidden information
and grounds that do not. A person who previously opposed intelligent
design on religious grounds may now wish to support intelligent design
based on scientific grounds. This distinction opens up more logical space.
This raises the question, "What are scientific grounds?" Given a sharp
definition of "scientific," the contrast between scientific and non-scientific
would be exhaustive. Unfortunately, a sharp definition is not to be had.
Decades of philosophical work on the problem of demarcation-the
problem of cleanly separating science from non-science-have shown the
distinction cannot be sustained. 26 Science textbooks, statements by learned
societies, even declarations from the bench appear oblivious to this fact.
There simply is no sharp line dividing the scientific from the non scientific.
One reason it seems impossible to draw a line of demarcation between
science and non-science is that scientific arguments are often philosophical.
Two brief illustrations should suffice. The first is an important argument by
Wallace. The second is an observation about our knowledge of biology.
Wallace's argument rests on the following conditional major premise:
[I]f, further, we should see that these very modifications, though
hurtful or useless at the time when they first appeared, became in
25. Under the influence of Alvin Plantinga, the Reformed Epistemologist, quite a few
Christian philosophers have argued that religious belief is rational and warranted even without
evidence. Be this as it may, many Christians supply reasons along these lines.
26. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE 1 (1989)(stating that his vision of
life is not provably more correct than the orthodox view); PHILLIP KITCHER, LIVING WITH
DARWIN 4-14 (2007)(describing the uselessness of using testability as criterion of science); J.
Blachowicz, How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method A Philosopher's Perspective, 60
THE BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 303, 339 (2009)(explaining how
scientists are falling behind the philosophy of sciene).
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the highest degree useful at a much later period, and are now
essential to the full moral and intellectual development of human
nature, we should then infer the action of [a?]mind, foreseeing the
future and preparing for it, just as surely as we do, when we see the
breeder set himself to work with the determination to produce a
definite improvement in the cultivated plant or domestic animal.27
To this conditional premise, Wallace added several premises supporting the
antecedent. Some of these premises dealt with physical traits, others with
mental and moral traits. Of particular importance to Wallace was the minor
premise, "early humans had a much larger brain and a surplusage needed in
their circumstances. 2 8
In The Descent of Man, Darwin left the conditional major premise in
place, directing his fire entirely at the minor premise. Darwin protested that
Wallace badly underestimated the challenges faced by early humans.
Darwin could have replied that Wallace's argument was unscientific
because the major conditional premise is a philosophical assertion. Instead,
Darwin attacked only one premise supporting the antecedent.29
The second illustration can be drawn from any biological text: the use
of microscopes to infer that the body is made up of cells. Researchers see
certain forms and colors and automatically infer that there is something,
some x, such that these are forms and colors of x. Such an approach
commits the researcher to a particular metaphysical outlook, something like
substance ontology. This means there is something of which the forms are
dependent attributes, an x, which is independent.3" If somebody doubted
this, as do philosophical opponents of substance ontologies, then one could
scarcely prove it by taking another look in the microscope. There is no way
to falsify this claim by experiment. Therefore, if an argument is scientific
only if it can be tested by experiment, there is nothing scientific about the
basis of cellular biology.
Today, it is customary to recognize several branches and sub-branches
of science, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw sharp lines between
them. Taking advantage of this custom, however, some have argued that
only biology should be taught in biology classes. There is a practical basis
to this view, but it does not warrant bending the canons of reason out of
shape.
Massimo Pigliucci introduces Scientists Confront Intelligent Design
and Creationism with this criticism of creationists who propose a high
school course on the science of origins:
27. WALLACE, supra note 19, at 193.
28. Id. at 195.
29. DARWIN, supra note 22, at 855.
30. See ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES (J. L. Ackrill trans., Oxford University Press 2002).
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Even a superficial acquaintance with science reveals that these
three subjects [evolutionary biology, biophysics, and cosmology]
actually belong to three very distinct disciplines, and that only the
first one has anything to do with the theory of evolution proper.
Darwinian mechanisms cannot get going until after life originates
on a planet, and, last time I checked, planets and galaxies were not
making babies that could be subjected to natural selection. In other
words, to put it in terms of "origins" is misleading at best, which
once again clearly reveals the thin veneer of science throw over the
creationist Trojan horse.3
Whatever one might think of the wisdom of offering a single high school
course on origins, Pigliucci makes a very fundamental mistake about
scientific argumentation and argumentation simpliciter.
The principle of total evidence, everywhere acknowledged, requires
that to evaluate the probability of a proposition all the relevant evidence
must be taken into account. It is entirely possible that evidence provided by
cosmology is immediately relevant to evaluating a hypothesis about
evolutionary biology. In its early days, Darwin's theory faced the objection
that cosmology indicated that the earth could not be old enough to support
the evolutionary process. Darwin realized that the only way to rebut this
objection was to show-or claim it would someday be possible to show-
that the earth was much older than thought at the time. We can be sure he
never dreamed of replying that because cosmology is not biology there is
nothing to worry about.
Today, cosmology furnishes another kind of evidence that is relevant to
considerations about evolution and intelligent design. This involves the
apparent springing into existence of the universe and of its being fine-tuned
from the beginning for intelligent life. If, as informed scientists and
philosophers have argued, the probability of an intelligent designer of the
universe is quite appreciable,32 then that fact can function as background
prior probability in a Bayesian argument encompassing biological data.
Again, we find ourselves with more logical space behind thesis T than
we might have initially imagined. Prospective buyers of conceptual space
can survey plots that allow for Darwinian or Wallacian design, and they can
consider plots that permit cases for intelligent design made up of much
more than just biological evidence.
31. Massimo Pigliucci, Introduction: The Problems with Creationism, in SCIENTISTS
CONFRONT INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND CREATIONISM 18 (Andrew J. Petto and Laurie R. Godfrey
eds., 2007).
32. See GOD AND DESIGN: THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND MODERN SCIENCE (Neil
Manson ed., 2003).
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2. There are many ways to teach a proposition.
The general meaning of the verb "to teach"-to convey information or
knowledge-can be gleaned from any dictionary. In order to investigate the
logical space associated with thesis T, we need to attend to instantiations of
the verb. Any proposition associated with thesis T can be taught in a
number of ways. Teaching in some of these ways will be quite minimal,
while in others quite maximal. Indeed, teaching can happen accidentally or
in passing. Accordingly, it might be said that teaching admits of degrees.
Once again, it becomes ever more obvious that the logical space behind
thesis T is enormous.
33
3. "Public school classes" encompasses a range of subjects.
Public school classes encompass a range of subjects and disciplines.
These classes include science and non-science classes. It could be argued
that intelligent design has a place in some classes but not others. Once
more, logical space opens up.
4. The term "may" has both an ethical and legal sense.
The term "may" can be understood philosophically or legally. That is,
"may" can function as a synonym for "morally permissible" or "right",
understood without reference to law or administrative fiat; but it also can
mean "permitted by law or other form of legislation." Given the ambiguity,
the two interpretation of the term "may" opens up yet more logical space.
Many propositions are associated with thesis T. These propositions
open up logical space that can be the basis for discussion and agreement.
We turn now to possible ways of occupying the available logical space.
11. Examining Three Plausible Responses to Thesis T.
Obviously, we cannot cover all possible responses to thesis T. For our
present purposes, however, it will suffice to consider three plausible
responses to thesis T, leaving the further interpretation for another time.
The three plausible responses set up a spectrum, with absolute rejection and
acceptance at the respective ends of the spectrum and selective prohibition
occupying the middle ground.
33. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114 (1968). Justice Black, in his concurrence,
argues that the Arkansas statute under consideration was unconstitutionally vague. The statute
failed to make it clear whether the statute prohibited mentioning Darwin's theory or declaring it to
be true. A corresponding obscurity attends a good deal of the discussion of intelligent design
today. Such obscurity may be due to the fact that there are many pertinent ways of teaching.
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1. Plausible Response 1: Absolute Rejection of Thesis T.
One plausible response is to bar intelligent design from the public
schools altogether. One might say, "On every interpretation of thesis T, I
oppose it." In Lewontin's language, "we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the
door." This is the absolute rejection of thesis T.
There seem to be two reasons for adopting the absolute response to
thesis T. The first reason is that intelligent design is a religious teaching.
The last thing public education needs is a number of teachers pushing a
religious agenda in public school classrooms. For those who want religion
taught in schools, there are always religious schools. The second reason is
that intelligent design is like astrology; there is no sound science to back it
up. While proponents of intelligent design have made a lot of noise, all their
arguments have been decisively refuted.
We will return to these objections, but first let us try to understand why
it is so difficult to maintain the absolute response to thesis T. An easy way
to see fatal problems with absolute prohibition is to consider three
examples. The first is a story about an unhappy effort to bring new life into
a program for high school honor students. The second is the text of the
Declaration of Independence. The third is taken from the foundation of
mathematics. After looking at these examples we will return to the two
objections above.
a. The Teacher's Tale.
This brief story is about a teacher named Phaenarete.34 The story is told
by Phaenarete to her local Board of Education. While it is fictional, the
story illustrates the heavy-handedness of the absolute response.
The trouble began when I accepted, with considerable eagerness, an
assignment to teach a new, elective high school course with philosophical
dimensions to well-tutored, college-bound students. I welcomed the
opportunity to work with students capable of seeing how particular
disciplines are interconnected and how certain pervasive philosophic
questions transcend the bounds of standard, discipline-based courses.
Happily, I was left quite free to select the materials I thought would
serve these purposes. I chose several short books, some old, some new. In
addition to what is often thought of as straight philosophy-works like
Plato's Phaedo-students encountered material from literature, art, music,
dance, and contemporary science-works like Jane Austin, Frida Kahlo,
Chinua Achebe and Stephen Gould. The last author got me into this fix. I
34. Phaenarete was the name of the mother of Socrates.
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chose Gould's popular Panda's Thumb because his writing is accessible
and beautiful. Several passages in his book lend themselves to discussing
overarching philosophical questions about human beings and our place in
the universe. I was particularly interested in the students' reaction to two
essays, the first entitled "The Panda's Thumb" and the second entitled "Our
Greatest Evolutionary Step." Students rose to the occasion.
"The Panda's Thumb" informs the reader that a panda's "thumb" is no
thumb at all but an enlarged component of what is normally a wrist bone.
The bone works well enough for the purposes of stripping bamboo, but to
our eyes the "thumb" appears to have been designed by a drunken engineer.
Gould claims this shows that no intelligent designer could have causally
contributed to the emergence of the thumb. In response to "The Panda's
Thumb," one of the brighter students asked, "If God wanted to make a
panda, how does Gould know that it would have been provided with a
'standard' thumb? How can Gould know with confidence what a divine
mind, with infinitely superior intelligence and obscure ends, would be
willing to produce?" This is exactly the question Elliott Sober raises in his
Evidence and Evolution.
Sober agrees with Gould that intelligent design arguments are exercises
in futility. Nonetheless, Sober, along with my precocious student, had
doubts about one of Gould's arguments.35 Gould argues that "[o]dd
arrangements and funny solutions are proof of evolution, for it mimics the
postulated action of an omnipotent creator - paths a sensible God would
never tread, but that a natural process, constrained by history, follows
perforce." 36 Without having read Sober, my student had echoed Sober's
criticism of Gould.
The aim of my class was not to answer such profound questions, but to
encourage students to think analytically. I wanted students to see that
arguments purporting to be entirely scientific are often based on
philosophical assumptions, which are often obscure.
Another student was taken by the last paragraph of "Our Greatest
Evolutionary Step." In that essay Gould wrestles with big brains and
upright posture: which came first and which is more important? My student
was struck by Gould's final musing:
It is now two in the morning and I'm finished. I think I'll walk over
to the refrigerator and get a beer; then I'll go to sleep. Culture-
bound creature that I am, the dream I will have in an hour or so
when I'm supine astounds me ever so much more than the stroll I
35. ELLIOTT SOBER, EVIDENCE AND EVOLUTION 127-28 (2008).
36. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: ESSAYS IN NATURAL HISTORY 20-21
(1980).
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will now perform perpendicular.37
"Why," the student asked, "would Gould be more astonished by his dream
than his stroll?" I invited the class to think this through. The students could
not let it go, perhaps because they had previously encountered the poem
"Dreams." The poem reads, "[h]ere we are all, by day; by night we're
hurl'd/ By dreams, each one into a several world."38 How can we move out
of this world into others, each separate? And more astoundingly yet, each
world is private! No one can dream your dreams, or for that matter, think
your thoughts, though it is of course possible to have similar dreams and
represent, privately again, the same propositions.
The size of the brain, the upright posture, and everything else about our
bodies appears explicable entirely in terms of physics and chemistry. But
how can these basic disciplines say anything about the weird, mental, and
utterly private interior life that gives all the meaning there is to the world?
And if the scientific disciplines cannot unfold the causes of our interior life,
need we look beyond physical causes to something literally out of this
world? These are the kind of philosophical questions commonly dealt with
at great length in the philosophical literature, and exactly the kind of
questions I had hoped the students would think up on their own.
Just as I was congratulating myself about the course, it blew up in my
face. Parents descended on me with questions about the purpose of the
class. Some asked, "Are you teaching intelligent design, creationism in
sheep's clothing?" Other parents asked, "Isn't any talk about 'God's
intentions' and 'supernatural causality' religious through and through?
Doesn't the Constitution forbid this?"
The parents complained first to me, then to the administration, next to
the local school board, and finally to the courts. I had hoped to guide
another young Socrates or Diotima. Instead I have made a mess of things.
Or have I? After all, what exactly did I do wrong? What should be
abandoned - all philosophy in public high schools or all philosophy edging
towards thought about the possibility of the divine? I can't think of a
reasonable answer. Can you?
This story demonstrates a secular way of presenting intelligent design.
It also shows that there are sound philosophical reasons for thinking about
intelligent design. Is it reasonable, as a matter of public policy, to bar
Phaenarete and everyone else from teaching a course like the one depicted?
Hardly.
37. Id., at 133.
38. Robert Herrick, Dreams, in WORKS OF ROBERT HERRICK 23 (Alfred Pollard ed. 1891).
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b. The Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration of Independence is another example of the futility of
the absolutist response. "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all
men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with certain
inalienable rights."39 What is to be done in classes in which these words are
studied? Should these words be banned from public schools? Mention of a
creator violates the absolute response. An explanation of this idea, so
fundamental to our society, will bring the teacher into conflict with the
absolutist prohibition.
c. The Foundations of Mathematics.
A third example of the futility of the absolutist response is found in
mathematics. Imagine a high-school course in the foundations of
mathematics, a course designed exclusively for mathematically-gifted
students. Suppose that one of the philosophical accounts of the foundations
of mathematics is the traditional theory-shared to various extents by the
monotheistic traditions-that all mathematical entities and relations are
ultimately grounded in the Mind of God. Teaching this philosophical
account will bring the teacher into conflict with the absolutist position.
Should this basic mathematical knowledge be banned from public schools?
The lesson of these examples is that absolutely barring teachers from
teaching intelligent design on the grounds that intelligent design is religious
or frivolous is unsustainable. Let us return to the original two objections.
d. Answering the Objections.
The first objection argued that intelligent design had to be kept out of
classrooms because it is not a scientific theory but only a religious teaching.
We answer that intelligent design is a religious teaching, in some sense.
However, from the fact that a proposition is religious it does not follow that
it is unwise or illegal to present either a statement of intelligent design or a
case for it in public schools. The concept may be religious only in the sense
that it bears on the existence and character of a god-like being. Yet, it is
possible that the case for the proposition about the god-like being appeals to
no authoritative sacred text, person, or institution. The case can be entirely
secular. The Teacher's Tale provides one starting point for just such a case.
The various modalities of consciousness, dreams, and other private internal
states may be seen as inexplicable on a strictly physicalist hypothesis.
Surely not every form of teaching can be reasonably excluded a priori from
public school classes.
39. The Declaration of Independence, 2 (U.S. 1776).
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What about cases that do rely on sacred texts, persons, and institutions?
Even these cannot be entirely excluded. What would be wrong with a
course on religions of the world? Even Dennett thinks such a course could
be a wonderful addition to a high school curriculum as an antidote to
religious nonsense.
The second objection argued that there is no sound science to support
intelligent design. We answer that this is an overbroad claim that relies
upon a simplistic view of science. The Teacher's Tale and the foundations
of mathematics show that science, even pure science such as mathematics,
rests on philosophical propositions that do not exclude intelligent design.
Therefore, it seems that the absolute rejection of thesis T is overwhelmingly
difficult to sustain.
2. Plausible Response 2: Absolute Acceptance of Thesis T.
The difficulty of absolutely rejecting thesis T on every construal of its
terms might be thought to imply that the proper response to the proposition
is absolute acceptance. However, it is also very difficult to defend thesis T
on every construal of its terms. We do not think that the absolute acceptance
of thesis T is an appropriate response to thesis T, and we have no interest in
supporting the idea that intelligent design be given equal weight in the
curriculum of each class. What has intelligent design to do with band class?
Therefore, some qualification of the range of acceptable interpretations of
thesis T is necessary.
3. Plausible Response 3: Selective Prohibition of Thesis T.
This section considers prohibiting intelligent design from certain public
school classes, particularly science classes. First, we will examine the
arguments for selective prohibition. Then we will examine the objections
to selective prohibition. Finally, we will offer a response to an argument for
selective prohibition.
a. Arguments for selective prohibition.
Which interpretations of thesis T are acceptable for science classes?
Proponents of selective prohibition might offer the following argument:
while it is all very well for intelligent design theory to be covered in some
courses outside of science, it is an altogether different matter to drag the
theory into classes dedicated to what modem science can tell us about the
origin, constitution, and powers of human beings.4 °
40. See ROBERT T. PENNOCK, Why Intelligent Design Should Not Be Taught In Public
Schools, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS 761-63(Robert T. Pennock ed.,
2001).
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We answer that this argument concedes that intelligent design may be
part of public school curricula. This concession removes the absolutist
objection to teaching intelligent design in public schools. If it is permissible
to teach intelligent design in non-science classes, compelling arguments
must be found to keep it out of science classes. What could those arguments
be? Three readily present themselves.
First, intelligent design theory has no place within the science
curriculum because it simply is not science at all. It is religion or, at best,
philosophy. Neither religion nor philosophy has a place in a science
program.
Second, our civilization cannot survive without an education system to
pass on the knowledge necessary for our communal life. The task of science
class is to communicate the scientific consensus regarding what is and can
be known about the physical world. It is impossible to effectively teach this
consensus while undercutting the very consensus to be taught. How can the
students be expected to master the complexity of biological systems while
pondering their philosophical validity? Questions of philosophical validity
are best left to colleges and universities, not high school science classes.
Third, intelligent design theory has not been validated through the
scientific method. The latest efforts to provide a scientific foundation for
intelligent design have been unmitigated disasters. On the rare occasions
that proponents use intelligent design to make scientific predictions, they
are proven wrong. Intelligent design has no validity as a scientific theory.
We will answer these arguments and set out our own position.
b. Arguments against selective prohibition.
This section presents the two strongest arguments for the proposition
that intelligent design should not be barred from sciences classes. The first
argument is that intelligent design can be taught in science classes because a
solid case for it can be made using the Wallacian version. The second
argument is that it is appropriate to teach the history of a given subject.
i. There is a solid case for the Wallacian version of intelligent
design.
The first argument is based on three premises: (1) the Wallacian version
of intelligent design at least appears to undercut the modem Neo-Darwinian
synthesis, as it is typically expounded; (2) there is a plausible case for the
Wallacian version of intelligent design; (3) if the Wallacian version of
intelligent design at least appears to undercut the modem Neo-Darwinian
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synthesis, as it is typically expounded, and a plausible case can be made for
that version of intelligent design, then it is permissible to teach intelligent
design in science classes. These three premises lead to the conclusion that it
is permissible to teach intelligent design in science classes. This is a modus
ponens argument. Premises (1) and (2) are the conjuncts of the antecedent
of conditional premise (3). If (1) and (2) are true, the consequent of premise
(3) can be detached. Since the argument is formally valid, the objection can
only be made to the premises.
(a) Considering Premise (1).
What is meant by "the Neo-Darwinian synthesis as it is typically
expounded?" It is not self-evident, and consulting authoritative texts often
leaves one thoroughly confused.4' Despite the lack of clarity, one is not left
with the impression that Neo-Darwinism needs recourse to the divine to
explain the biological and cognitive capacities of every organism, including
human beings. This is in conflict with the Wallacian version of intelligent
design.
The conflict between Neo-Darwinism and Wallacian intelligent design
cannot be underestimated. Dennett pulls no punches about it:
Almost no one is indifferent to Darwin, and no one should be. The
Darwinian theory is a scientific theory, and a great one, but that is
not all it is. The creationists who oppose it so bitterly are right
about one thing: Darwin's dangerous idea cuts much deeper into the
fabric of our most fundamental beliefs [then] many of its
sophisticated apologists have yet admitted, even to themselves.42
Darwin recognized this conflict and rejected Wallace's theory. If these two
brilliant creators of evolutionary theory clashed on such an important
matter, which of us is so bold as to declare they were mistaken?
Two additional reasons support the existence of a conflict between
Neo-Darwinism and Wallacian intelligent design. First, even those who
claim there is no genuine conflict, such as Christian philosopher Nancy
Murphy, admit that "atheistic philosophical naturalism ... [is] presupposed
in most of the cases of popular books written in defense of evolution."43
Second, those who claim there is no conflict are generally muddled about
their contentions. Consider, for example, how the notion that Neo-
Darwinism and ideas about God are not in conflict has been picked up by
the courts. For example, in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, the
41. See AYALA, supra note 13, passim (arguing that Darwin's theory explains adaptation not
evolution).
42. See DENNETr, supra note 4, at 18.
43. Nancy Murphy, Phillip Johnson on Trial: A Critique of His Critique of Darwin, in
INTELLIGENT DESIGN: SCIENCE OR RELIGION 181, 194-95 (Stuart & Rosenbaum eds., 2007).
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court observes that:
The approach to teaching "creation science" and "evolution
science" found in Act 590 is identical to the two-model approach
espoused by the Institute for Creation Research and is taken almost
verbatim from ICR writings. It is an extension of Fundamentalists'
view that one must either accept the literal interpretation of Genesis
or else believe in the godless system of evolution.4
But then the court goes on to say:
The two model approach of the creationists is simply a contrived
dualism which has no scientific factual basis or legitimate
educational purpose. It assumes only two explanations for the
origins of life and existence of man, plants and animals: It was
either the work of a creator or it was not. Application of these two
models, according to creationists, and the defendants, dictates that
all scientific evidence which fails to support the theory of evolution
is necessarily scientific evidence in support of creationism and is,
therefore, creation science "evidence" in support of Section 4(a).45
It will not escape the notice of the logically attuned that the court shifts
between the first and second paragraph in a manner that utterly darkens the
issue.46
The first paragraph rightly points out that the Fundamentalists who
have found themselves in court as defendants cannot sensibly maintain that
one must either accept the literal interpretation of Genesis or else believe in
the godless system of evolution, since there are many other alternatives. In
other words, there is not even the appearance of an inconsistency between
the Court's view and the view we advance.
But, in the second paragraph, the court rephrases its contention. Here,
the "contrived dualism" of the creationists assumes "only two explanations
for the origins of life and existence of man, plants, and animals: it was
either the work of a creator or it was not." This is a very different
contention. Between the contradictory statements "is the work of a creator"
and "is not the work of a creator" no third possibility remains. 7
We answer that this is no contrived dualism. Whether or not the
defendants put their point in a way that allowed for a middle ground, we
close off the possibility of a middle ground. Either there is something
spiritual about human beings that cannot be explained by Neo-Darwinian
natural science or there is not. Intelligent design takes the affirmative: there
44. 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
45. Id.
46. This issue is further discussed in Part II of this essay.
47. This is proven by the logical principal tertium non datur.
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is something spiritual about human beings that cannot be explained by
natural science.
This real and natural dualism is between belief in the controlling action
of a higher intelligence and the rejection of this belief. Either there is
something about our nature and operational capacities that demands an
efficient cause from outside of the natural world, or there is not. Some
Christian evolutionists and courts point out that it is entirely possible to
believe in a god, even the Christian God who creates the world and saves its
rational inhabitants.48 Such people miss the point. The existence of a god
and the truth of evolution are compatible only if the god does not control
events in the world. There is no "contrived dualism" here. Dennett and
many atheists see this clearly.
This real and natural dualism is a point of great significance, so let us
be as clear as possible. Consider the following statement made by Ayala
concerning logical conclusions based on the scientific method. "If one
explanation fails, it does not necessarily follow that some other explanation
is correct... The discovery of oxygen did not simply happen because it
was shown that phlogiston did not exist."4 9 This is true as far as it goes, but
it is not whole story.
Consider the following. If hypothesis H-I is false, then the catch-all
hypothesis not-H-1 is true. And in some cases, that catch-all hypothesis not-
H-i can be divided in such a way that a particular sub-hypothesis
immediately emerges as the winner.5" For example, H-I says that the
universe is a permanent entity. If H-I is proved false, then the catch-all not-
H-lis true. Not-H-i presents three possibilities. First, not-H-l(a) contends
that the universe had no cause. Second, not-H-1(b) contends that the
universe was self-caused. Finally, not-H-i (c) contends that the universe was
caused by a distinct being. If you cannot swallow highly implausible not-H-
I(a) or not-H-i(b), then your best bet is not-H-l(c). Not-H-i(c) does not
reveal what this distinct being is, nor does it explain how the distinct being
caused the universe. What not-H-1(c) does do is establish the probability
that the distinct-being hypothesis is true.
At this point, one might object that we have not sufficiently answered
the contention raised in the introduction that science is committed only to
methodological naturalism. This contention is spoiled by an underlying
ambiguity. Methodological naturalism invokes only natural causes when
explaining empirical data. What does this mean? It could mean that
methodological naturalism only invokes natural causes as a means to
48. Murphy, Miller, Ayalya cited earlier all hold this view.
49. AYALA, supra note 13, at 76.
50. Not necessarily in the sense that it is certain, but that it is more probable than the
competitor and more probable than not.
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identify the necessary physical conditions of their occurrence. It could also
mean that it invokes only natural causes based on the assumption that all
possible sufficient causes are physical. If the claim is the former, then
methodological naturalism leaves room for divine beings that exercise
divine causality. If the claim is the latter, there is no room for divine beings
exercising divine causality.
The former interpretation does not fit standard scientific practice. For
example, a teacher will not explain how a flashlight works by saying, "On
top of the flow of electricity, it takes the special action of a god to turn on
the light." Standard scientific practice supposes that once the electrical
action and the character of the metals are understood, the flashlight is
understood. It appears that the latter interpretation of methodological
naturalism is the better fit here: no room for a divine cause. This creates a
conflict between standard scientific practice and Wallacian intelligent
design.
Those who believe that proponents of intelligent design are mistaken
about methodological naturalism have a sophisticated answer, similar to the
one offered by Kenneth R. Miller in Finding Darwin's God.5" Miller points
out that the entire controversy about the place of God in evolution is mired
in nineteenth-century science. Before the advent of quantum mechanics,
everyone, including Darwin, saw the unfolding of organic life as a
deterministic process. For them, a physical explanation of an event follows
necessarily from some antecedent physical condition possibly subject to a
final determination by scientists. Miller further observes that contemporary
biology has not yet caught on to the idea that quantum mechanics massively
influences the development of life; contemporary biologists tend to think
about physical laws as they did in the nineteenth century.
In Miller's opinion, once it is understood that quantum mechanics rules
out predictability, science must give up on the idea of offering a statement
of the conditions that are not only necessary but jointly sufficient for the
emergence of an event. Therefore, our declaration that the first
interpretation of methodological naturalism does not fit science is true only
of the science practiced by those who have yet to catch up with the
implications of quantum mechanics. So, our distinction actually works
against our argument.
This is a subtle response, but ambiguity in Miller's argument renders it
ineffective. Miller is right about how sophisticated theorists view
contemporary biology, but he confuses two understandings of the term
"sufficient." On one hand, an explanation is sufficient if it provides the
means for making exact predictions. In this sense, Miller denies that
51. KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING DARWIN'S GOD 204-218 (1999).
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physical explanations are ever complete. On the other hand, an explanation
might be "sufficient" in the sense that it posits all the causes that bring
about a given state of affairs. Quantum mechanics, its laws, and other
physical laws are sufficient in the sense that they provide all the explanation
that is possible. Although these laws give us no tools to predict the future
based on prior events, there is no need to introduce a creator because the
physical laws provide as entire an explanation as can be had, even in
principle.
What does Miller think about this second sense of the term "sufficient"?
Miller is unclear about his view, but from time to time he seems to indicate
that methodological naturalism does indeed offer sufficient explanations in
this second sense of "sufficient." For it is difficult to see what else he could
be thinking when he remarks, "Any idea that life requires an inexplicable
vital essence, a spirit, an elan vital has long since vanished from our lives
and laboratories, a casualty of genetics and biochemistry."52
Has the need for a "vital essence" completely vanished? Hardly. Many
philosophers seriously consider the possibility of non-physical human traits,
siding with Wallace against Darwin. Darwin believed that "man's whole
nature -physical, mental, intellectual and moral - was developed from the
lower animals by means of the same laws of variations and survival; and, as
a consequence of this belief, that there was no difference in kind between
man's nature and animal nature, but only one of degree."53 Wallace
disagreed. In his view, the difference is in kind, not just degree. "While [the
human] body was undoubtedly developed by the continuous modification of
some ancestral animal form, some different agency, analogous to that which
first produced organic life, and then originated consciousness, came into
play in order to develop a higher intellectual and spiritual nature of man."54
Darwin was irked by Wallace's appeal to "some different agency."
Darwin would not have been pacified by the idea that science is only
methodologically naturalistic. He sought, and thought he had found, the
sufficient causes of man's completely physical nature. There is no need to
introduce anything spiritual or supernatural about man. Nor is there any
need for a supernatural cause to explain man's unique mental and moral
powers. The same would surely be said by the majority of biologists
practicing today. That is why they celebrate the power of science to explain
so many illnesses and bizarre behavior previously attributed to spirits. The
exclusion of the supernatural as an intervening cause in the physical world
is not a mere adventitious belief of modem practicing scientists. It is central
52. Id., at 214.
53. ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE, My LIFE: A RECORD OF EVENTS AND OPINIONS 16 (1905).
54. Id., at 16-17.
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to their methodology, which accounts for all natural behavior by appealing
to causes that are entirely physical.
Therefore, it can be said that the Wallacian version of intelligent design
undercuts the modem Neo-Darwinian synthesis, as typically expounded.
(b) Considering premise (2).
Recall that premise (2) reads, "There is a plausible case for the
Wallacian version of intelligent design." This premise is hotly contested.
Some opponents declare, "Not a chance!" For example, Dennett calls
intelligent design "a pathetic hodgepodge of pious pseudo-science."55
Others have said the same with the same delicate reserve. Yet, one should
thoughtfully consider the premise before taking them at their word.
Given the consensus established by the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, how
are we to know whether Wallace's arguments are plausible? The anticipated
answer is underwhelming: evidence from a dozen scientific disciplines
supports the proposition that all organisms, including homo-sapiens, arose
from some pre-biotic source. This answer is underwhelming because there
is at least something to be said about the evolutionary problems connected
with the origin of life. For the sake of discussion, however, let us suppose
with Darwin, Wallace, and all who have worked in the field of evolutionary
biology that modem evolutionary theory gives an adequate explanation for
unconscious organisms. Let us also assume, for the sake of discussion, that
Wallace's arguments are wrong with regard to physical features. 6 Further,
let us assume that all these features could be explained better than with the
sort of "just-so" stories Lewontin scorns. And finally, let us assume that
there is nothing to the worry voiced by Darwin and elaborated in our time
by Alvin Plantinga, that unguided evolution has little chance of producing
reliable cognitive capacities.5
Let us assume all this. Still, even after all these injurious concessions
are made, it remains possible to outline a case that ought to give pause to
the opponents of teaching intelligent design in public school science
classes. The case has two parts. The first part focuses on consciousness qua
consciousness; consciousness abstracted from its modalities. The second
concentrates on one particular form of consciousness: consciousness of
55. See DENNETT, supra note 4, at 18.
56. WALLACE, supra note 19, at 172-212. Wallace pointed to a number of physical features,
including the early emergence of a big brains as best explained by the action of a conscious mind
operating outside of nature and seeking to provide humans with what they would need long after
this supernatural agent conferred the properties on them.
57. See JAMES BEILBY, NATURALISM DEFEATED (2002)(providing an expression of
Plantinga's position in itself and in response to criticism).
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abstract entities. 8
What exactly do we mean by consciousness qua consciousness? It must
be admitted that there is no agreed upon definition of consciousness, and it
may well be the case that no exact definition is possible. We have the same
problem with other familiar realities such as motion. One might take a shot
at defining motion by saying it's passing from here to there, but a moment's
reflection reveals that "passing" is just another term for "moving." But it
does not follow that we have no idea of what motion is or that we should
doubt that it exists. Similarly, it does not follow that we have no idea of
what consciousness is or should doubt there is such a thing. For example,
we know what Gould was talking about when he said he was stunned by his
ability to dream. Dreaming represents one of the lowest levels of
consciousness, so low that some would say we are entirely unconscious
when we dream. To say this is to acknowledge that one understands the
difference between conscious and unconscious states. It is helpful to think
of dreaming as a minimal state of consciousness because then we can use it
as a foundation for considering heightened forms of consciousness, the
times when we are acutely aware of what is going on around us.
Following the lead of Steven Pinker, Ray Jackendoff, and Ned Block,
some cognitive neuroscientists have found it useful to distinguish between
"sentience," "access to information," and "self-knowledge." 59 Access to
information is the ability to report on the content of mental experience
without the capacity to report on how the content was constructed by the
nervous system. Self-knowledge is the capacity to report on one's own
states. Of particular importance to our argument is sentience. In the words
of the authors of Cognitive Neuroscience, sentience "refers to the subjective
experience, phenomenal awareness, raw feelings, first-person tense, what it
is like to be here to do something. If you have to ask, you will never
know."60
As noted in the previous quotation, cognitive neuroscientists confess to
finding consciousness elusive. Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun recognize the
same problem. "Right from the start we could say that science has little to
say about sentience. We are clueless on how the brain creates sentience." 61
Many philosophers have echoed the perplexity of these neuroscientists.
58. See WALLACE, supra note 19, at 197. The argument does not depend on Wallace's idea
about the capacities early humans, the conditional premise of his argument earlier cited, but on the
separable notion that there is something spiritual about the process of grasping universals, often
called "abstraction." Our argument is nonetheless in line with Wallace's to the degree that he also
looks to this power as indicative of this spiritual something.
59. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE
MIND 657-59 (2nd ed. 2002).
60. Id.
61. Id.,at659-60.
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Jerry Fodor, for example, says, "Nobody has the slightest idea how
anything material could be conscious. Nobody even knows what it would
be like to have the slightest idea about how anything material could be
conscious.""
Underlying all these doubts is the realization that no matter how
detailed the account of what is going on in the brain, it is always possible to
ask, "Why do I have any sensation at all?" Put a bit more formally, the
question becomes the following. If a putative explanation E is a genuine
and complete explanation of a phenomenon P, then it should not be possible
to grasp E, in relationship to P, and still logically ask, "But why does P
occur?" This seems to be why Nicholas Humphrey is sufficiently taken with
the problem of consciousness to hearken back to Wallace and to ask aloud
whether, as the title of his essay has it, consciousness is the Achilles' heel
of Neo-Darwinism. Without a doubt the strange phenomenon of
consciousness is a problem for physicalists.63
Consciousness is a problem for Neo-Darwinism, but it might be
problematic for non-physicalists like Wallace. The "why" asked in the
previous argument means, "How exactly does the connection between the
causal factors invoked by explanation E and the phenomenon P work?" No
one can understand how a supernatural being can imbue material with the
capacity for consciousness. But even if we could, it seems that it would
nonetheless be possible to conceive of a world in which God did not create
finite consciousness. That is, it seems that it would be possible to grasp the
explanatory factor, God, and still ask sensibly, "But how exactly did God
do it?"
In contrast to physicalistic explanations of consciousness, theistic
explanations have the virtue of invoking a causal agent. If this causal agent
were to exist, it would have the metaphysical power to bring about
consciousness, even though we do not have any direct insight into exactly
how that divine power would or could do it. Physicalistic explanations do
not even do that much. They do not invoke any causal factor which could
metaphysically accomplish the feat. This will become clearer when we
consider a special modality of consciousness.
The problem of consciousness qua consciousness for Neo-Darwinism is
actually more than one problem. We have just considered the first problem:
how can matter produce this odd, subjective, and private state? A second
62. See Nicholas Humphrey, Consciousness: The Achilles' Heel of Darwinism? Thank God,
Not Yet, in INTELLIGENT THOUGHT: SCIENCE VERSUS THE INTELLIGENT DESIGN MOVEMENT 50,
53-54 (John Brokman ed., 2006).
63. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 148 (explaining that, if science has no understanding at all
at this time of how consciousness has been produced by the physical system, it is probably
premature for evolutionary theory even to suggest how it developed).
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and perhaps more pressing problem for Neo-Darwinism is how
consciousness influences the world.
By a physicalist account, consciousness is either identical with neural
activity or produced by its neural correlate. Thus, many of our actions are,
in the parlance of some neuroscientists and philosophers, "zombie" actions.
For example, as you read the morning paper, you unconsciously pick up
your coffee cup and start drinking the coffee. Does this not suggest that a
physicalist understanding of consciousness adequately accounts for our
experience? Does not the neural activity, the neural correlate of
consciousness, suffice for the effect? And if it does, what purpose could
consciousness possibly play in the world? If it has no function, how could
evolution select for it? Much has been written on this difficult problem,
with no satisfactory answer.
In his lauded work, Quest for Consciousness, Christof Koch explains
how both healthy and brain-damaged persons execute learned, stereotypical
behavior in a rapid and flawless manner.' The possibility of all activity
carried out in this zombie-like fashion prompts him to raise a troubling
question. "If so much processing can go on in the dark, without any
feelings, why is a conscious mental life needed at all? What evolutionary
advantage favored conscious brains over brains that are nothing but large
bundles of zombie agents?"65 Koch gives an answer that stretches over two
chapters, but has conceded that the answer is unsuccessful.66 To date,
zombie-based explanations have not proved satisfactory.
Volumes have been written on the problems mere consciousness poses
for physicalism. Some of the most articulate accounts resist at all cost the
notion that consciousness is divinely connected to neurological activity.67
Others emphatically declare the need for divine action.68 This by itself tells
us enough to secure our second premise: there is a plausible case for
Wallacian intelligent design.
The second argument for the validity of our second premise has to do
with a special form of consciousness: the consciousness of abstract
entities.69 The basic idea of this argument is that we are capable of
consciously grasping properties that can be instantiated apart from their
manifestations. For example, you not only can recognize the family cat, but
64. CHRISTOF KOCH, THE QUEST FOR CONSCIOUSNESS: A NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACH
(2004).
65. Id.,at231.
66. This concession was made by Professor Christof Koch to the author in a private email on
Sunday, January 22, 2006 at 8:19 CST (on file with author).
67. See COLIN McGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME (1999).
68. See J.P. MORELAND, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (2008).
69. This topic could be treated in its own book. We will do our best to provide a short
account capturing the main ideas of this topic.
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you can also cognitively grasp the property of being a cat.7" This is an even
greater cognitive achievement. Recognition of an instantiable attribute C is
not the same as being able to recognize every particular that happens to
instantiate C. It is rather to grasp, however vaguely, what it is to be a C, C-
ness itself.
Now, here is a strange thing about this capacity; it elicits an activity that
is not entirely physical. This is because an action that is entirely physical,
such as a machine stamping a coin, takes place within the space-time
continuum. On one end of the action, we have a physical object in the
space-time continuum, the stamping machine. On the other end of the
action, we have another physical object in the space-time continuum, the
coin being stamped. The action of the machine stamping the coin takes
place in space and time; it moves in a certain direction at a certain velocity.
Notice that for this action to be physical it is necessary for both relata of the
action to be in the space-time continuum.
In contrast, the psychological act of grasping an instantiable concept
does not meet the conditions of an entirely physical act. The instantiable C
itself is nowhere and is at no-when. It makes sense to ask, "Where is the
cat?" It makes no sense to ask, "Where is cat?" This question is nonsensical
because the property itself is never found in space and time; it is only
present in localized manifestations. Wallace earned a living by bringing
back specimens of unusual animals from Malaysia. He never dreamed of
trying to bring home an exotic species, an abstract beetle or monkey.
Should one protest that the instantiable character C certainly is in the
space-time continuum, being in the localized manifestations, one need only
imagine an instantiable character C that cannot make such an appearance.
Take as C the logical property of being valid. Because arguments
themselves are not in space-time, though their representation in words are,
and no part of the brain or brain activity has the property of being valid, this
C, validity, is not per se in the space-time continuum. It follows that human
beings, and possibly other organisms, are capable of activities that are not
entirely physical. To be sure, there are ways of answering this argument,
but such answers have a difficult time explaining why the premises of this
argument are false.
If the premises of this argument are true, what does that tell us about
intelligent design? The conclusion by itself does not assert anything about a
god-like being. Additional premises are necessary to make the case that our
cognitive capacities are, in some measure, dependent on a supernatural
70. We here skirt complications about the boundaries of properties. These complications
have led Darwinians to deny that there are species or kinds of things. The complications can be
avoided by keeping to properties like "moving" "two" and "valid." But for simplicity, we'll allow
ourselves to talk about cats and humans.
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cause. Such premises are not hard to imagine. They consist of the
contention that no physical process can give rise to non-physical activities,
not even partially non-physical activities. Furthermore, if an organism finds
itself capable of not entirely physical activities, there must be some cause of
the capacity; it would not have just popped into existence without a cause.
If there is a cause and the cause is not physical, then it must be non-
physical, which is to say, supernatural. This is exactly what Wallace
thought.
This argument is not a demonstration. Much more must be said about it
to secure the validity of the premises advanced. It should be noted,
however, that this argument is unlike all the popular arguments for
intelligent design, which are based on what can and cannot be produced by
chance. This argument is deductively valid and logically sound. To that
extent it is insulated from objections based on use of statistics and
probability. Therefore, not only is this an argument worth contemplating, it
is as accessible as the Darwinian account of evolution. The argument has
something going for it both with respect to the truth and with respect to
pedagogical issues. Phaenarete could easily teach its elements.
(c) Considering premise (3).
We come now to the last premise, the conditional that combines in its
antecedent premises (1) and (2). There are three arguments for the content
of premise (3). The first deals with censorship. The second deals with
academic integrity. The third deals with the permissibility of teaching
intelligent design in public school classes.
The first argument turns on the idea of censoring books. Should science
students be barred from reading Wallace, Darwin, Gould, Dennett and a
vast number of other authors dealing with this conflict? That hardly makes
sense. If these authors are read in science classes, students will encounter
arguments for and against intelligent design. We should not censor the
intellectual development of our children.
The second argument for premise (3) turns on the idea of academic
integrity. Intellectual and academic standards of integrity not only permit
but require that any hypothesis be presented in a way which incorporates its
major strengths and weaknesses. One of the major weaknesses of the Neo-
Darwinian hypothesis is its inability to adequately explain the origin of
consciousness qua consciousness or the special mode of consciousness
targeting abstract properties. This means that the Neo-Darwinian hypothesis
cannot be presented as a complete theory. Therefore, intellectual and
academic standards of integrity require that public schools present the Neo-
Darwinian hypothesis in a way that clearly explains the limits of the theory.
The fact that Neo-Darwinism contains a major weakness permits the
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presentation of an alternative hypothesis which, if accepted, would remedy
that particular weakness. Intelligent design is one such hypothesis. Hence,
intellectual and academic standards of integrity permit the presentation of
intelligent design as a reasonable alternative to Neo-Darwinism.
The third argument for premise (3) has been established by the
Teacher's Tale. It is permissible to teach intelligent design in at least some
classes. It seems odd to permit the teaching of intelligent design in a
philosophy class, but not a biology class. What sense would it make to
permit a hypothesis to be presented in one class, a counter-hypothesis in
another, but never the two together? Or should the competing hypotheses be
set side by side only in a philosophy class, the philosophy teacher
explaining evolution, not the science teacher?
It might be replied that this is not as odd as it sounds because the entire
issue is philosophical, not scientific. We answer again that this distinction
does not hold. Consider an example from chemistry. Chemists might think
it possible to produce a certain molecule. This hope could be dashed by
purely mathematical demonstrations that the geometry of the molecule is
impossible. Just as the scientific disciplines are subject to the constraints of
pure mathematics, why cannot philosophy also serve such a corrective role?
ii. It is permissible to teach the history of a given subject.
We turn now to the second argument for permitting the teaching of
intelligent design in science classes. It can be stated much more briefly than
the first, as it depends on arguments already made in the previous section. It
runs as follows. (1) If teaching a subject to high school students is
appropriate, then so is teaching the history of the subject. (2) If it is
permissible to teach high school students modem physics, it is permissible
to teach them about Galileo and Newton. (3) Teaching evolutionary biology
is appropriate. (4)The key teachings of Wallace, co-creator with Darwin of
the theory of evolution, belong to the history of evolutionary biology. (5)
Wallace teaches that natural selection has its limits and human beings are a
result of the action of a supernatural being. (6) It follows from these
premises that it is appropriate to teach Wallace's ideas in public school
science classes. These premises need little elaboration.
3. A response to an argument for selective prohibition.
In the course of arguing our case, most of the arguments on the other
side have already been considered. We have addressed the contention that
intelligent design is not a science. We have addressed the contention that
intelligent design is not validated through the scientific method. We have
not addressed perhaps the most thoughtful argument for selective
prohibition. This argument contends that our civilization cannot survive
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without an education system to pass on the knowledge necessary for our
communal life. The task of public schools is to convey to the next
generation the knowledge established by previous generations. What is
"established" is never beyond challenge, but there are appropriate venues
for launching these challenges. Public school science classes are not among
them.
For example, a philosophically attuned high school mathematics teacher
might believe that there is no such thing as mathematical truth. Such a
teacher should not undercut student confidence by declaring that the only
truth in mathematics is its internal consistency. Nor should the teacher
spend valuable time discussing truth, truth-makers, and Platonic and
Formalist theories at the expense of actually teaching the course material to
students. In the same way, biology teachers charged with explaining the
structure of reproductive cells, DNA, selection and genetic drift, and other
matters of high importance should not distract the class with philosophical
arguments about the limits of evolutionary theory.
Our contention has never been that teachers must teach intelligent
design, but only that they may. Students who struggle to grasp the basics of
biology may not be ready to delve into the complex problems associated
with the genesis of our private internal states. Even when students are
capable of understanding these problems, circumstances may not permit
them or their teachers to address them. Not every teacher is capable of, or
comfortable with, exploring such deep questions.
Many teachers are so accustomed to seeing correlations as explanations
that these questions will strike them as entirely incomprehensible. By itself,
this is not a problem. But there is a problem when teachers are forbidden
from addressing these questions. We see such a ban in public schools today.
Schools and teachers are encouraged to remain silent about the challenges
to the Neo-Darwinian account. Such encouragement comes from experts
whose narrow vision of the issues predictably leads them to advocate for an
over-simplified curriculum. These experts make life difficult for the
Phaenaretes of this world.
It is hard to see any sense in an interdiction of every mode of teaching
of intelligent design in public school classes. It is hard to imagine why we
should censor the way we engage the arguments of distinguished scholars.
Further, it is hard to understand why we coddle these theories, protecting
them from the rigors of philosophical investigation. Finally, it is hard to see
why students should be kept oblivious to the impact of Neo-Darwinism on
their fundamental beliefs.
Ill. Conclusion.
Our response to thesis T is that no teacher should be barred from
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teaching intelligent design in appropriate circumstances. If intelligent
design is not part of the curriculum, a decent respect for students'
intellectual development demands they at least be informed that only one
side of an old argument has been set before them.
PART II
LEGAL ISSUES
In the second part of our essay we shall discuss the legal context in
which the question of teaching evolutionary theory arises in public schools.
We shall argue for five major propositions. (1) It is a political and
sociological fact that the Supreme Court's method of interpreting and
applying the Constitution necessarily relies upon philosophical
argumentation. (2) That fact renders philosophical argumentation entirely
appropriate and necessary on the part of those who are engaged in analyzing
and evaluating the Court's constitutional interpretations and applications.
(3)The standard of review the Court frequently applies to the interpretation
and application of the Establishment Clause is irretrievably flawed and
should be replaced with a different standard of review which we shall
formulate and defend. (4) The Court's evolution cases are fundamentally
misguided. (5)The philosophical recommendation regarding the teaching of
evolutionary theory in public schools we articulated in Part I of this essay-
that it should be permissible for public school districts to permit, but not
require, the introduction, discussion, and evaluation of non-physicalist71
explanations of life-should be held constitutional under our proposed
standard of review.
L Basic Legal Background
Given the philosophical nature of this article, it may be that some of the
readers of this essay will be neither lawyers nor law students. Accordingly,
it may be useful to begin by sketching some of the legal background of the
conference's theme.
71. In Part II we shall use the term "non-physicalist" instead of "intelligent design." We do
this because "non-physicalist" is a more inclusive term, which avoids suggesting that our
arguments are tied to one particular non-physicalist explanation of life. We will use the term
"creation science" to refer to a theory maintaining that "the earth was created within the specific
time stated in Genesis and that the species were created at once and did not evolve from lower to
higher orders." Carol Weisbrod, Evolution and Creation Science, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 263 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
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1. Introductory
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . ,7" The sentence, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" is traditionally
referred to as the Establishment Clause. The interrupted sentence,
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise thereof," is
customarily referred to as the Free Exercise Clause.73
Readers of the Constitution who know little or nothing about the history
of judicial interpretation of that document, and who focus exclusively upon
these two constitutional provisions, might reasonably assume that they
restrict only the powers of Congress. After all, Congress is the only branch
of the Federal government mentioned in the Clauses. Such a reader might
understandably argue that, if the Framers had intended to extend the
restraints of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to the President
and the Federal Judiciary, they would have done so explicitly. Nevertheless,
the Court has long held that the Religion Clauses limit the powers of both
the President and the Courts.74
The Court has held that the Religion Clauses also apply to all levels of
Federal and State government75 by virtue of the implied content of the Due
Process Clause of the 14 thAmendment. The Due Process Clause reads, "..
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . ,,76 The use of the adjective "implied" is appropriate
because nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause explicitly refers
to either of the Religion Clauses.
The long-established Federal judicial interpretation of the
Establishment Clause raises the following question: under what
circumstances is it constitutionally permissible for Federal or State
government to assist religious activities? Analogously, the Free Exercise
Clause raises this question: under what circumstances is it constitutionally
permissible for Federal or State government to burden religious activities?
If the answers to both questions are overbroad, then a conflict between the
Clauses is inevitable. For example, suppose that the Establishment Clause is
interpreted as prohibiting government from assisting religious activities in
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 n.16 (1979); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998).
75. The phrase "all levels" includes State, qua State, County, and Local government. In
particular, public school districts are included.
76. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947)(incorporating the Establishment
Clause against state governmental power); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(incorporating the Free Exercise Clause against state governmental power).
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any way and that the Free Exercise Clause is interpreted as prohibiting
government from burdening religious activities in any way.
There are many situations in which government is forced to choose
between assisting and burdening religious activities. For example, consider
the provision of police and fire protection to religious activities. The
provision of such services assists religious activities, whereas the denial of
such protection burdens religious activities. The government must choose
between the two. Choosing the former would violate the Establishment
Clause; choosing the latter would violate the Free Exercise Clause. This
situation arises in many other situations, such as providing tax exemptions
to religious activities. Thus, one of the challenges presented in interpreting
the Religion Clauses is to sufficiently restrict the scope of one or both in a
way which avoids such conflicts."
2. Constitutional standards of review
How does the Supreme Court resolve these questions in the context of
judicial appeals? Fundamentally, the Court does not typically resolve any
constitutional issue by appealing exclusively to the language of the various
constitutional clauses. Instead, the Court invokes and applies what are
traditionally referred to as standards of review. A standard of review is a
judicially created and formulated test or criterion that the Court applies to
determine whether a particular action of the Federal or a State government
conforms to the requirements of some provision of the Constitution.78 Thus,
a standard of review functions as a linguistically expressed judicial
interpretation of a constitutional provision.
Standards of review are determinative factors in constitutional
litigation, but it is important to understand that there are no standards of
review, in this sense, explicitly articulated in the Constitution itself. The
political fact of the matter is that the entire law of constitutional standards
of review is judicially created by the Supreme Court. A consequence of this
political fact, is that there is an important sense in which the present
Constitution can be ascertained only by focusing upon the published
opinions of the Supreme Court itself-as contrasted with focusing solely
upon the language of the Constitution. This explains the traditional lawyers'
maxim that the Constitution is not the document ratified in 1789, together
with its later Amendments, but is rather the view of the sitting members of
the Supreme Court.
77. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314 (1952) (interpreting the Religion
Clauses).
78. Of course, all other courts in the United States, both Federal and State, are required to
apply whatever constitutional standards of review the Supreme Court has, for the time being,
decided to use, when those other courts apply the federal constitution.
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This understanding of the political reality of the temporary and
fluctuating content of Constitutional law was explicitly expressed by former
Justice William Brennan:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we
can: as Twentieth-Century Americans. We look to the history of the
time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But
the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean
in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in
the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems
and current needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to
the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of
our time.79
The point is that this "vision of our time," at any given time, is ultimately in
the hands of one or another coalition of at least five of the nine current
justices of the Supreme Court.
3. Why standards of review?
Why has the Court interposed its own judicially-formulated standards
of review? An explanation is that long ago the Court concluded that many
of the provisions of the Constitution are so vague that they cannot be
applied in any non-arbitrary way. For example, consider the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: ". . . Nor shall any
State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." What precisely is it to deny to a person the equal protection of
the laws? An indefinitely large number of alternative interpretations are
possible and the words of the provision itself offer little or no prospect of
adjudicating between such alternative interpretations. As a consequence, it
is understandable that the Court has chosen to tie its own standards of
review to vague constitutional provisions.
Another possible explanation is that some of the constitutional
provisions are too clear. For example, some provisions are linguistically
phrased in absolute terms, which apparently permit no exceptions or
qualifications. A standard example is the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.... ." Literally interpreted, it might seem that this provision prohibits
Congress from enacting any law which restricts speech in any way.
79. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 27
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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Nevertheless, despite Justice Black's protestations,"° the Court has never
construed the clause in this literal way, presumably because the Court has
never believed that an absolute protection of speech would be good public
policy.
4. Some examples of Constitutional standards of review
Given the relatively abstract nature of our exposition, a few specific
examples of constitutional standards of review used in the First Amendment
context might help comprehension.
Strict scrutiny requires the Government to prove that the content-
restrictive action promotes some compelling government interest. Consider
the Free Speech Clause: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech. .. " First, suppose that government has acted in a way
which restricts the semantical content of a speech act. Next, suppose that
there is no exception to the First Amendment which applies. In such a case,
the Court presently applies strict scrutiny where it is virtually impossible for
the government to prevail.
The next standard, intermediate scrutiny, is used when the government
restricts only the time, place, or manner of speech. In such cases the
applicable First Amendment standard of review provides that the
Government has the burden of proving that its action was content-neutral, is
narrowly tailored to serve some significant governmental interest, and
leaves open ample alternative channels of communication."81 Although it is
not as severe a standard as a strict scrutiny standard, intermediate scrutiny is
nevertheless strict enough to make it quite difficult for the government to
win.
An example of rational basis standard of review would be when the
government regulates the semantical content of speech in a governmentally-
controlled forum which is not a traditional public forum, not voluntarily
opened up to speech activities, and not used by the government for its own
expressive purposes. According to the Court the government is permitted to
do so in any fashion, as long as the regulation of speech is reasonable in the
light of the intended purpose of the government's forum.82 A rational basis
standard of review makes it extremely difficult for the government to lose.
This list of Free Speech Clause standards of review could be extended
indefinitely, but it would be sufficient to say that the Court has enormous
discretion when it comes to applying constitutional provisions to litigated
80. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
(describing Justice Black's absolutist theory of the Free Speech Clause).
81. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
82. Id.
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situations by means of its own judicially-formulated standards of review.83
When it comes to understanding constitutional law, reading the
constitutional text itself is only a bare beginning. The Court's standards of
review function as translations of the Constitutional text itself, which
readily suggests that those standards of review instrumentally substitute for
the words of that text. Constitutional law is not the Constitution unadorned,
but rather the Constitution as translated by the Court's standards of review.
This is the primary way in which the law of the Constitution is brought to
bear upon persons in the United States.
5. The Court's willingness to use its own standards of review
enormously increases its discretion and flexibility in
interpreting the Constitution.
All standards of review can be conceived of as arranged on a spectrum.
At one end lies strict scrutiny where the government has little or no chance
of prevailing. At the other end of the spectrum lies rational basis, where the
government is virtually certain to succeed.
Between the two ends of this imaginary spectrum are situated a large
variety of standards of review, although there is often controversy and
uncertainty as to which of such two "in-between" standards ranks above the
other in terms of degree of severity. For example, the Contract Clause of
Article I provides, "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."'  The Court has translated this provision by
means of a standard of review providing that a State impairment of an
existing contract interest is constitutional if and only if the impairment is
reasonable and necessary to serve some important governmental objective.85
In contrast, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides,
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."86 The Court has translated this
provision by means of a standard of review providing that if the regulated
activity in question is sufficiently integral to the welfare of the Nation as a
whole, then the regulatory burden is constitutional if and only if it is closely
related to the promotion of a substantial governmental objective.87 It is
uncertain which of these two standards of review is stricter.
83. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)(setting out the standard of review for
prohibiting sexually-oriented materials); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)(setting out the
standard of review for "fighting words"); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(setting out
the standard of review for speech acts urging people to violate the law).
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
85. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
86. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2.
87. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
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Why is all this significant? One who is unaware of the Court's practices
of constitutional interpretation might easily suppose that any particular
provision in the Constitution carries the same legal force as any other. After
all, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, so how could it be that
some constitutional provisions are "more supreme" than others?
The answer is that some constitutional provisions are "more supreme"
than others in virtue of their varying semantical translations into the Court's
set of standards of review. As we've seen, the Court has at its disposal an
indefinitely large number of standards of review, ranging all the way from
extremely tolerant o extremely strict standards. By choosing to semantically
translate any given constitutional provision by means of a stricter or weaker
standard of review, the Court can unilaterally direct the legal force of that
provision in any direction it chooses. The following three instances are
examples of the Court using this power to effectively eliminate a
constitutional provision altogether.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States ... ."88 This Clause is traditionally referred to
as the "Privileges or Immunities of United States Citizens Clause."89 In the
Slaughter-House Cases the Court effectively eliminated that Clause from
the Constitution by holding that it was redundant because it failed to add
any liberty protections to those already existing in the Constitution.9"
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, ".... nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."'" The
phrase 'for public use' is generally referred to as the "public use
requirement." Paradigm instances of public uses include highways, streets,
sidewalks, public parks, railroad lines, and airports. The use of the
adjective "public" seems to suggest that Government may not condemn
private property for "private" uses, even if it is willing to pay adequate
compensation. Despite this common-sense interpretation, in Kelo v. City of
New London92 the Court essentially drained the "public use requirement" of
all legally significant semantical content by holding that Government may
transfer the title to private property from certain private citizens to other
private citizens, such as real-estate developers, for the latters' own private
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
89. This Clause must be distinguished from the earlier-mentioned Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.
90. There is, however, some very obscure language in Saenz v. Roe, hinting that the Court
might be prepared to reconsider the matter; although, the language in question does not seem to
commit itself to the thesis that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment actually adds liberty guarantees in its own right. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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uses and profit, so long as it is minimally rational for Government to have
believed that such a property transfer will create at least some indirect
economic benefit to the community at large, such as increased property tax
valuations and greater numbers of available jobs.
The third example concerns the Eleventh Amendment's provision, "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."93 Read literally, the Clause prohibits Federal court lawsuits against
States, when those suits are brought by citizens of a State other than the
defendant State or by citizens of a foreign State. In Hans v. Louisiana4 the
Court chose to ignore the exclusionary semantical force of the phrase
"citizens of another State." The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars even federal court lawsuits brought by citizens of the defendant State
itself. Thus, after Hans, the Eleventh Amendment effectively reads, "...
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of any State,
including the defendant State itself...."
The Court then ruled in Ex parte Young95 that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar federal court lawsuits against states, so long as the relief
requested is equitable. Young effectively eliminates the phrase "in law or
equity" from the Eleventh Amendment, which must now be read as, "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit whatever .. ."96 These examples show the Court has the unlimited
legal power to effectively eliminate words and phrases from the
constitutional text.
Eliminating words and phrases from the constitutional text is not the
only tool the Court employs. The Court can also retain the original words
and phrases but adjust their legal force by selectively attaching its own
constitutional standards of review to the language. Examples of this kind of
"intra-Clause" flexibility include the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, ".... nor shall any State... deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."97 In
cases of racial or ethnic classifications, the Court translates this language
into a strict scrutiny standard of review: The State bears the legal burden of
proving that its racial or ethnic classification promotes a compelling
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
94. 134 U.S. 1(1890).
95. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
96. There are a number of later complex interpretive moves the Court has made with respect
to the Eleventh Amendment in the decades following Young, none of which we shall take up here.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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governmental objective in a necessary way.9 In sharp contrast, in cases of
sex classifications, the Court translates this same Fourteenth Amendment
language into an intermediate standard of review: The State bears the legal
burden of proving that its sex classification promotes an important
governmental interest in a substantial way, where the term "important" is
weaker than "compelling" and the term "substantial" is weaker than
"necessary." 99 In further contrast, in cases of classifications of economic
interests, the Court translates this same Fourteenth Amendment language
into a rational basis standard of review: the classification is constitutional so
long as it promotes a constitutionally permissible objective in a minimally
rational way.' This is an example of the Court selecting a single
constitutional provision and splitting its legal force into three distinct
degrees, depending upon the type of legal context in which the Clause is
judicially applied. This type of judicial dexterity could be described
infinitely.'0°
In summary, we provided a long but nonexclusive list of examples to
support our thesis that the Supreme Court has a legally unlimited power to
restate and restructure the Constitutional text in any way it sees fit.
Considerations such as these have motivated legal scholars to characterize
American constitutional law as being expressed common law with an ever-
evolving set of judicial decisions as opposed to being expressed in any
single document." 2 Thus the Constitution can be characterized as nine
sitting judges rather than a document.
6. The unlimited legal power of the Court to translate provisions of the
Constitution into its own self-selected standards of review
makes room for philosophical argumentation in arguing for
and against particular constitutional interpretations.
The very text of the Constitution inevitably requires philosophical
reflection and analysis when it comes to the interpretation and application
of it. There are many ambiguities in the Constitution. The term "religion" is
found in the religion clauses but there is a not a definition of the term. Do
secular physicalist worldviews qualify as a religion? The term "speech" in
the free speech clause and the term "person" in the due process clause are
also undefined which leaves open questions about whether burning a flag
98. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
99. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. Beach Comm'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
101. Compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to burdens
upon the abortion interest), with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (applying rational basis
scrutiny to economic interests).
102. See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 330
(1988).
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constitutes speech or whether a fetus qualifies as a person. The equal
protection clause uses the phrase "equal protection." What precisely does
that mean? Does a progressive income tax qualify as equal protection of the
law?
Any serious effort to answer such questions will quickly struggle with
what are essentially philosophical issues. Thus, even in the absence of the
complex structure and hierarchy of standards of review fashioned by the
Court, interpreters of the Constitution would have to engage in
philosophical analysis and reflection. It seems that, even apart from the
question of interpreting the constitutional text, the suggestion that there
could be any litigation which completely excludes any philosophical
considerations is an illusion.
In any case, the presence of the complex structure and hierarchy of
standards of review dramatically increases the frequency and necessity to
invoke philosophical arguments and considerations when it comes to
constitutional interpretation. There are at least two aspects of this frequency
and necessity.
First, the Court's standards of review are philosophical tools. Anyone
who supposes that the Court's interpretation and application of the
Constitution by means of its self-selected standards of review involve only
purely legal considerations need only read one or two of the Court's
opinions. Thus, any adequate attempt to defend or challenge a Court
decision would necessarily require using philosophy.
An example of this philosophical phenomenon is the Court's choice to
give speech a high degree of protection under the Free Speech Clause,
especially with respect to content-based regulations. One of the Court's
traditional rationales for this choice was expressed by Justice Holmes, and
has been reiterated many times since:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe.., that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
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save the country. 103
This rationale is clearly philosophical in nature. Indeed, it essentially the
justification for protecting speech proposed by John Stuart Mill in his book,
On Liberty.1" Other examples include the use philosophy in interpreting
the dormant commerce clause 5 and liberty interests in abortion." 6
Of course, we are dealing with two different types of philosophy.
Applied philosophy differs from the abstract philosophy which occurs in the
typical academic context. The kind of philosophizing that occurs in the
context of constitutional litigation is inevitably constrained and limited by
the specific nature of the particular situations and issues involved in any
given lawsuit. Indeed, judicial philosophizing at the constitutional level
necessarily begins with specific legal situations.1"7 From such specific legal
situations, courts ascend to a level of abstract philosophical reflection. After
resolving the philosophical issues at the abstract level, courts return to the
specific legal situations and apply the principles they formulated in the
abstract. Nevertheless, despite being constrained and limited by specific
factual contexts, the use of philosophy that takes place in constitutional
litigation is just as philosophical in nature as the detached and abstract
philosophizing done in purely academic contexts.108
Applications of standards of review inevitably make more room for
such philosophical argumentation. Because of the ways in which these
standards are typically formulated they generate philosophical issues in
their own right. Applications of standards of review in litigation are
necessarily contested. Hence, to the extent to which these standards are
themselves expressed in philosophical terminology, the application of those
standards to specific legal situations also triggers conflicting philosophical
analysis and argument.
In summary, the Supreme Court essentially functions as the supreme
Philosophical Administrator and Overseer of the American legal system.
This role allows the Court to modify the framework and content of the legal
103. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
104. See especially Chapter II of that work.
105. H.P. Hood and Sons Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)(explaining the
philosophy of the Dormant Commerce Clause); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935)(supporting the philosophy behind the standard of review for the Dormant Commerce
Clause).
106. See also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)(philosophizing that at the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence).
107. This is a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "case or controversy"
provision of Article III of the Constitution.
108. It may help to compare the distinction between abstract and applied philosophy to the
distinction between the Socratic philosophy-arguing from particulars to universals-and the way
in which academic philosophers typically philosophize-arguing from universals to particulars.
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system whenever it unilaterally decides to promote the Common Good, as
perceived by a majority of the Court. One of the inevitable consequences of
the Court playing this role in our legal system is that the need for formally
amending the Constitution in the democratic way provided in Article V has
been largely eliminated.
II. The Court's Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
1. The Lemon Test
One of the Court's most frequently applied standards of review under
the Establishment Clause is the three-part Lemon Test.0 9 Lemon held that
in order for a governmental action to be constitutional under the
Establishment Clause the following criteria must be satisfied: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...,
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion.""'" Lemon is a disjunctive test, which means that a failure to
satisfy any of the three criteria results in a violation of the Establishment
Clause. It has generated much debate.
2. What exactly is a religion, anyway?
According to the Court's standard of review, any application of the
Establishment Clause must involve governmental regulation of a religion.
But what precisely counts as a religion? The Court has never purported to
definitively answer the question; it has merely offered hints not subsumable
under any comprehensive defimition. We shall briefly describe two such
efforts to illustrate the range of possible judicial interpretations of the term
"religion."
a. An apparently very broad formulation.
United States v. Seeger"' illustrates one end of a spectrum of
interpretations. The case involved a federal statute exempting from the draft
any persons "who by reason of their religious training and belief are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.""' The statute
defined the term "religious training and belief' as "an individual's belief in
109. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court has not applied the Lemon test in
all of its Establishment Clause cases decided since 1971; however, it has been frequently applied
and has not been overruled. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 1202 (3d ed. 2006).
110. Lemon, 403 U.S. at612-13.
11I. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
112. ld. at 164-65.
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a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but (not including) essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."' ' 3
Seeger was one of three litigants whose cases were consolidated on
appeal. He was convicted in Federal District Court for refusing to submit to
induction into the armed services, instead claiming an exemption as a
conscientious objector. Seeger asserted that:
He was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form
by reason of his 'religious' belief; that he preferred to leave the
question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, 'rather than
answer 'yes' or 'no'; that his 'skepticism or disbelief in the
existence of God' did 'not necessarily mean lack of faith in
anything whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a
purely ethical creed.' He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle
and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and
moral integrity 'without belief in God, except in the remotest
sense.'114
The District Court rejected his claim "solely because it was not based upon
a 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being' as required by section 60) of the
Act."' 15
The Supreme Court held that the statute's use of the term "religion"
included world views such as Seeger's: "We believe that ... the test of
belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption."'" 6 Thus, the Court held that the statutory exemption applied
to anyone who asserts a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed,' 17 regardless
of whether or not they believe in a Supreme Being.
As support for its interpretation of the statutory exemption, the Court
cited the views of the Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich: "The eminent
Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views the Government
concedes would come within the statute, identifies God not as a projection
'out there' or beyond the skies but as the ground of our very being.""' The
Court further quoted Tillich:
113. Id. at 165.
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 167.
116. Id. at 165-66.
117. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
118. Id. at 180.
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I have written of the God above the God of theism .... In such a
state (of self-affirmation) the God of both religious and theological
language disappears. But something remains, namely, the
seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaningless is
affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within
meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of
traditional theism but the 'God above God,' the power of being,
which works through those who have no name for it, not even the
name God. 19
In further support for its interpretation of "religion," the Court
proceeded to cite The Second Vatican Council,' Bishop John A.T.
Robinson, author of Honest to God,11 and David Saville Muzzey, author of
Ethics as a Religion.1
22
In commenting specifically upon Seeger's case, the Court said:
[T]here was no question of the applicant's sincerity. He was a
product of a devout Roman Catholic home; he was a close student
of Quaker beliefs from which he said 'much of (his) thought is
derived'; he approved of their opposition to war in any form; he
119. Id. (citing PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND THE CHRIST 12
(1957)). The Court's quotation compresses and slightly modifies the actual passage, which reads
in full:
In the last chapter of my book The Courage To Be.. . I have written of the God above
the God of theism. This has been misunderstood as a dogmatic statement of a
pantheistic or mystical character. First of all, it is not a dogmatic, but an apologetic,
statement. It takes seriously the radical doubt experienced by any people. It gives one
the courage of self-affirmation even in the extreme state of radical doubt. In such a state
the God of both religious and theological language disappears. But something remains,
namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is
affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of
certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the 'God above God,'
the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the
name God. This is the answer to those who ask for a message in the nothingness of their
situation and at the end of their courage to be. But such an extreme point is not a space
within which one can live. The dialectics of an extreme situation are a criterion of truth
but not the basis on which a whole structure of truth can be built.
120. Id. at 181-82 (citing Draft Declaration on the Catholic Church's Relations with Non-
Christians, in COUNCIL DAYBOOK 282 (Vatican II, 3d Sess., 1965).
121. Id. at 181 (citing JOHN A. T. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD 15-16 (1963)). The Court
quotes this sentence: "But the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the whole
conception of a God 'out there,' which has served us so well since the collapse of the three-decker
universe, is itself becoming more of a hindrance than a help."
122. Id. at 182-83 (citing DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, ETHICS AS RELIGION 98 (1951)). The
Court quotes these sentences:
Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the
devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a
community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been
elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men .... Thus
the 'God' that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the perfect
pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements
which retard its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the right.
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devoted his spare hours to the American Friends Service
Committee and was assigned to hospital duty. 23
In summing up its ruling on Seeger's case, the Court said:
Seeger professed 'religious belief and 'religious faith.' He did not
disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being'; indeed he
stated that 'the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative
intelligence.' He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man must
pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs
and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think
the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have
granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which
prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the
belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the
Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it,
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything
traditional that you have learned about God.. .' Tillich, The
Shaking of the Foundations. 57 (1948).124
Although all three litigants challenged the constitutionality of the
statutory exemption, the Court avoided reaching constitutional issues by
holding that the statutory exemption applied to the three cases at hand. The
Court's holding is one of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
meaning. However, despite Seeger's narrow holding, commentators have
construed the case as strong evidence of what the Court would have said
had it chosen to reach the constitutional issue. 25 One explanation for this
general consensus is that the Court purposely construed the statute beyond
the legislative intent. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring
opinion:
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is,
in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words
'Supreme Being' to include the cosmos, as well as an
anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no
more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to
construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on
constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case then the present one
we said that the words of a statute may be strained 'in the candid
123. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185-86.
124. Id. at 187 (citation in original).
125. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1189 (3d ed. 2006).
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service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt.' 116
If Seeger is to be construed as an implied Constitutional interpretation,
what is the corresponding definition of religion? We begin with the Court's
own formulation: "[T]he test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."
' 12 7
Some readers might immediately protest our implicit assumption that,
in purporting to define the phrase, "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being,"
the Court is, at least implicitly, purporting to define the phrase, "religious
belief." Why didn't the Court explicitly say that it was defining the latter
phrase? We would suggest that, in effect, the Court just that: "The crux of
the problem lies in the phrase 'religious training and belief which Congress
has defined as 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.' 12 8 Thus, the Court
apparently assumed that in defining the phrase, "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation," it was simultaneously defining the phrase, "religious training and
belief," that is, in short, simply 'religious belief."' 29
Some readers might grant this inference, but still object that the
conventional semantical meaning of "religious belief' is not identical to the
meaning of "religion." Because, it might be argued, the semantical
extension of the latter tern seems to include, not only sets of beliefs, but
also communal symbols, rituals, patterns of worship, patterns of conduct,
etc. We concede the point. Any historical religion consists of indefinitely
more than a set of beliefs. An historical religion is, at the very least, a
community, persisting through time, of persons who share a set of beliefs, a
set of symbols, a set of rituals, a set of normative patterns of worship, and a
set of normative patterns of conduct. 3 0
126. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring)(quoting United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41, 47 (1953)). It seems difficult to accept the second sentence of this passage as a sincere
expression of Douglas's actual belief. Given the explicit language of the statutory exemption, it is
perhaps best to regard Douglas's sentence as a tongue-in-cheek joke. Whatever Congress meant
by the term "Supreme Being," it surely did not mean "the material universe," or, for that matter,
"the object of a belief that is sincere and meaningful [which] occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption" (paraphrasing the Court's interpretation of the statute). It seems more accurate to
interpret Douglas's comment as, e.g., "Of course, we know what you (Congress) meant. But we're
just not going to let you mean that and we have the last word."
127. Id. at 165-66.
128. Id. at 173.
129. Note that the Court's formulation of the equivalence has the effect of discarding the word
"training." "Religious training and belief' is transformed into simply "religious belief."
130. See, e.g., JOHN COTrINGHAM, THE SPIRITuAL DIMENSION: RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND
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However, conceding this point does not further commit us to the
proposition that the Seeger Court made a similar concession. On the
contrary, so far as one can tell from the majority opinion, one can have a
religion without participating in a community which shares symbols, rituals,
worship, and patterns of conduct. The only condition, both necessary and
sufficient, for having a religion is simply possessing a set of religious
beliefs. The Court assumed, without argument, that Seeger, as an isolated
individual, possessed religious beliefs, despite the fact that he did not
participate in any ongoing religious community. According to the Court, a
religion is something which one can have all by oneself. This is a
significant claim. It implies that anyone qualifies as having a religion for
First Amendment purposes, so long as she or he has a set of religious
beliefs. Having a religion just is having a set of religious beliefs.131
We have argued that the Seeger Court maintained that having a religion
just is having a set of religious beliefs. Or, putting it more precisely, and
numbering it for later reference:
[I ]X has a religion if and only if X has a set of religious beliefs,
where 'X' ranges over the class of humans.
What is the Court's analysis of the property of having a set of religious
beliefs? For an answer, it may be useful to return to the Court's own
language, ".... [T]he test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." '132 What can be inferred from
this remark?
First, the statement presupposes the existence of a class of paradigmatic
religious beliefs. For example, presumably the religious beliefs of orthodox
Christians, Jews, and Muslims would all qualify as paradigmatic religious
beliefs, at least in the Court's mind. All such religious participants believe
HUMAN VALUE (2005).
131. A brief digression: One might ask why we assert that this claim is "significant." One
reason is this. Identifying an historical community as a religious community, and thereby
identifying that community's participants as possessing a religion in virtue of being active
participants in that community, is much easier epistemically than identifying some particular
individual as having a religion in her own right, considered independently of religious community
to which she may belong. But it seems likely that this very epistemic difficulty induces a more
lenient and lazy approach to the question, "Is there a religion in this case?" Given the inherent
epistemic difficulty of answering that question in any particular case, the natural human, and
therefore judicial, tendency is to conclude, "Well, so what? X's case is close enough, and I'm
getting tired of being asked to formulate criteria for determining, in any particular case, precisely
how close is "close enough."
132. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
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in the existence of a Ground of Being'33 which is ontologically distinct from
the physical universe. Second, the statement presupposes the existence of a
relation between this class of paradigmatic religious beliefs and another
class of beliefs that, although sincerely held by their possessors, are not
paradigmatic religious beliefs. Third, the statement presupposes the
existence of a two-place relation between these two classes of beliefs that
can be expressed as follows: the members of class x play the same role in
the lives of their possessors as the members of class y play in the lives of
their possessors, where the variables 'x' and 'y' range over classes of
beliefs.
Putting these three observations together, we can now more fully
characterize the second class of beliefs we temporarily designated as "the
class of beliefs" which, although sincerely held by their possessors, are not
paradigmatic religious beliefs. Now that we have specified the two-place
relation between the two classes (x plays the same role in the lives of its
possessors as y) we can re-characterize the second class by means of the
relational predicate (x plays the same role in the lives of its possessors as
paradigmatic religious beliefs play in the lives of their possessors). Given
this, we can re-characterize the second class of beliefs as "the class of
beliefs which play the same role in the lives of their possessors as the role
paradigmatic religious beliefs play in the lives of their possessors."
However, we have not clarified the meaning of the phrase, "play the
same role in the lives of their possessors as." We can better make sense of
this phrase by first understanding the Court's conception of the role
paradigmatic religious beliefs play in the lives of their possessors. In light
of the Court's extensive references to the writings of Paul Tillich, it seems
reasonable to assume that it was heavily influenced by Tillich's analysis of
the role of religious belief in religious believers' lives. According to one of
the quotations the Court takes from his writings, Tillich maintains that the
essential characteristic of genuine religious beliefs are their focusing upon
matters of ultimate concern to the believer, i.e. what is taken seriously
without any reservation.'34
According to Tillich, it follows that paradigmatic religious beliefs
necessarily focus upon matters of ultimate concern to the paradigmatic
133. PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: VOLUME 1 235-36 (1951).
The being of God is being-itself. The being of God cannot be understood as the
existence of a being alongside others or above others. If God is a being, he is subject to
the categories of finitude, especially to space and substance .... Whenever infinite or
unconditional power and meaning are attributed to the highest being, it has ceased to be
a being and has become being-itself. Many confusions in the doctrine of God and many
apologetic weaknesses could be avoided if God were understood first of all as being-
itself or as the ground of being. The power of being is another way of expressing the
same thing in a circumscribing phrase.
134. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187.
Barring Intelligent Design From Public Schools
religious believers holding such beliefs. It presumably also follows that,
non-paradigmatic religious beliefs necessarily focus upon matters of
ultimate concern to non-paradigmatic religious believers. Thus, the element
common to both paradigmatic religious beliefs and non-paradigmatic
religious beliefs is the property of being a belief bearing upon a matter of
ultimate concern to its possessor.
We can summarize the preceding analysis in terms of the following
numbered propositions, beginning with our previously-stated Proposition
[1]:
[I]X has a religion if and only if X has a set of religious beliefs.
[2]X has a set of religious beliefs if and only if either X has a set of
paradigmatic religious beliefs or X has a set of beliefs which play the
same role in the lives of their possessors as paradigmatic religious
beliefs play in the lives of their possessors.
[3] Label the class of beliefs in [2] as non-paradigmatic religious
beliefs.
[4] Hence, [2] can be restated as: X has a set of religious beliefs if
and only if either X has a set of paradigmatic religious beliefs or X
has a set of non-paradigmatic religious beliefs.
[5] Both paradigmatic religious beliefs and non-paradigmatic
religious beliefs bear upon matters of ultimate concern to their
possessors.
[6] Hence, [4] can be restated as: X has a set of religious beliefs if
and only if X has a set of beliefs which bear upon a matter of
ultimate concern to X.
[7] So, substituting in [1] yields: X has a religion if and only if X
has a set of beliefs bearing upon a matter of ultimate concern to X,
where 'X' ranges over the class of humans.
Proposition [7] motivates another question. What exactly is an ultimate
concern? We begin with Tillich's own formulation, the formulation the
Court relied upon: "An individual's ultimate concern is whatever that
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person takes seriously without any reservation." '135 How should that be
understood?
In raising this question we are not asking what Tillich means by
"ultimate concern." Answering that question would require a difficult
analysis of the various senses in which Tillich uses the phrase "ultimate
concern." However, we can assert one thing with relative certainty: Tillich
does not believe that every particular ultimate concern striven for by an
arbitrarily-selected individual is necessarily identical to what Tillich regards
as the only legitimate ultimate concern, namely God, conceived of as the
ground of all being.136 Thus, even though Tillich apparently holds that
everyone necessarily has one or another ultimate concern, he also maintains
that any particular individual's personal pursuit of his ultimate concern can
be radically misdirected (in the sense of being directed toward goals that,
even if attained, will not satisfy the passions and desires motivating that
individual's pursuit of his ultimate concern).
Understanding this point may be helped by grasping an elementary
distinction. The term 'ultimate concern' is potentially ambiguous. Imagine
an arbitrarily-selected person, X, who is pursuing an "ultimate concern." It
is important to distinguish between the objective of X's "ultimate concern,"
where that object will presumably be some state-of-affairs, on the one hand,
and X's subjective state of desiring and striving for that state-of-affairs.
Thus, the term 'ultimate concern' may be used to refer to either the
objective of X's subjective state of desiring and striving, on the one hand,
or to X's subjective state of desiring and striving itself, on the other. This
distinction can be baptized with a semantical stipulation. Given an
arbitrarily-selected person, X, we shall characterize X's state of desiring
and striving for her ultimate concern as X's ultimate-concern desiring and
striving and shall characterize the state-of-affairs itself which is the
objective of X's ultimate-concern desiring and striving as X's ultimate
concern.
Using this stipulated terminology, we can say that Tillich believes that
every human agent is fundamentally motivated by an ultimate-concern
desiring and striving for some particular ultimate concern. That is to say,
every human agent is motivated by a fundamental passion and desire to
bring about some state-of-affairs whose attainment that agent believes
would constitute the complete fulfillment of her deepest desires. However,
although Tillich does not make the point as clearly as one might like, he
also believes that any particular human agent's state of ultimate-concern
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., TILLICH, supra note 64, at 10-15, 21, 24-25, 28, 36, 42, 50, 110-11, 118, 156,
211,214-16, 218,220-23,230, 273.
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desiring and striving can be misdirected, in the sense that her aimed-at
ultimate concern may, even if attained, fail to fully satisfy that agent's
deepest desires.
This possibility of an individual's particular state of ultimate-concern
desiring and striving being aimed at an inappropriate ultimate concern was
explicitly recognized by many earlier philosophers and theologians. For
example, Thomas Aquinas, Plato, and Aristotle explicitly argue that there is
no guarantee that any particular individual's state of ultimate-concern
desiring and striving is necessarily directed to an ultimate concern that
proves to be authentic, i.e. a concern that even if attained, would completely
satisfy that individual's deepest desires.
In contrast, the Seeger Court makes no attempt to draw this distinction
between authentic and inauthentic ultimate concerns. Why did the Court
ignore Tillich's distinction? One plausible explanation is that the Court
recognized that any attempt to draw a distinction between authentic and
inauthentic ultimate concerns could have the effect of privileging certain
ultimate-concern perspectives over others in the application of the Religion
Clauses. In particular, when it comes to applying the Free Exercise Clause,
authentic ultimate concerns would be entitled to special protection, in
contrast to inauthentic ultimate concerns. In contrast, when applying the
Establishment Clause, inauthentic ultimate concerns would not be
constrained, while authentic ultimate concerns would be.
Whatever the motivation underlying the Court's refusal to adopt
Tillich's distinction, the consequence of the Court's approach is that any
"ultimate concern" qualifies as "religious" under the Court's analysis.
Imagine someone whose entire waking life is organized around the
overriding desire to engage in any one of the following activities: golfing,
gambling, drinking, eating, using drugs, having sex, pursuing a career,
making money, being famous, etc. It seems that any of these commonplace
ultimate concerns qualify as religious under the Seeger Court's analysis.
Each is an objective that at least some people take seriously without any
reservation-meaning at the very least-regarding an objective as
potentially overriding the attainment of any other possible objective
whatever. This interpretation of the Court's analysis is supported by
ordinary linguistic usage, e.g., "Golf is X's religion," "Eating is Y's
religion," "Making money is Z's religion," etc.
However such cases might be classified in terms of the Court's
analysis, it seems clear that the ultimate concern of an individual who is
fundamentally motivated by a physicalist conception of reality qualifies as
"religious" under this analysis. Imagine a paradigmatic physicalist, X. X
believes that there are no non-physical causes whatsoever; there is no non-
physical ground of being. Every fact in the universe is wholly explicable in
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terms of other wholly physical facts. Reality is physical through and
through. Moreover, this fundamental conception of reality guides X's entire
life, including X's conception of morality, society, the ultimate meaning of
human existence, and the point of living at all. One need think only of
Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett, an evangelizing secular pair driven by
a missionary zeal to convert the masses to secular physicalism. 3 7 Even
better, think of Richard Lewontin, whom we quoted in Part I as warning
fellow secularists, ". . . for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door." This
observation is significant because, if secular physicalism qualifies as a
religion under the Establishment Clause, then the Supreme Court's
exclusion of non-physicalist accounts of evolution from public-school
classrooms would violate that Clause. The effect of that exclusion would be
leaving the public-school forum to just a single religious point of view, that
of secular physicalism, to the detriment of non-physicalist points of view.
b. An apparently very narrow formulation.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
protects Amish children from the application of a Wisconsin law requiring
children to attend school until the age of sixteen.'38 In holding that the
Amish qualify as having a religion within the semantical scope of the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court analyzed the issues very differently than it did in
Seeger.
First, the Court said,
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if
it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief. Although a determination of what is a 'religious' belief or
practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most
delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes
allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
137. Incidentally, this seemingly obvious consequence of the Seeger Court's analysis of
'religion' has an important consequence for the Court's qualification, "We also pause to take note
of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on
this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic believes. We do not
deal with or intimate any decision of that situation in these cases." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-74.
How the Court could assert this proposition in the face of its own interpretation of 'religion' in the
very case-at-hand is puzzling, to say the least.
138. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. 139
This appears to be a dramatically different analysis from that applied in
Seeger: Thoreau, or philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, for
that matter, would qualify as having a religion under the Seeger analysis. If
anyone ever had an all-encompassing ultimate concern that focused, guided,
and motivated his entire waking life, Henry David Thoreau did. Granted,
Thoreau did not belong to an organized group of like-minded persons, but
neither did Daniel Seeger. If Seeger, an independent and religiously-
unaffiliated freethinker, had a religion, then, afortiori, Thoreau did, and so
did Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza. However, the Court in Yoder rejected the
proposition that Thoreau had a religion because his "choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious.""14  The apparent
implication is that an individual cannot have a religion by himself. One
must be a participating member of a group, whose values and objectives
transcend the merely "subjective" and "personal" values and objectives.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Yoder evidences the case's
radical departure from Seeger's explication of 'religion':
In another way, however, the Court retreats when in reference to
Henry Thoreau it says his 'choice was philosophical and personal
rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands
of the Religion Clauses.' That is contrary to what we held in
United States v. Seeger... where we were concerned with the
meaning of the words 'religious training and belief in the Selective
Service Act. 141
After quoting extensively from Seeger, Justice Douglas went on to say, "I
adhere to these exalted views of 'religion' and see no acceptable alternative
to them now that we have become a Nation of many religions and sects,
representing all of the diversities of the human race."' 42
Let us return to the majority opinion, which states:
Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see
that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the
traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. That the
139. Id. at 215-16.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 247-248 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 249.
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Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their
faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal
interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to
the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world...' This command is
fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for the Old Order
Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief. As the
expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades
and determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with
the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of
the church community.
The record shows that the respondents' religious beliefs and
attitude toward life, family, and home have remained constant -
perhaps some would say static - in a period of unparalleled progress
in human knowledge generally and great changes in education. The
respondents freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith,
that their religious beliefs and what we would call today 'life style'
have not altered in fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in
a church-oriented community, separated from the outside world and
'worldly' influences, their attachment to nature and the soil, is a
way inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to
preserve against the pressure to conform. Their rejection of
telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of dress,
their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart from much of
contemporary society; these customs are both symbolic and
practical. 143
Precisely what is the majority's semantical analysis of the First
Amendment's use of "religion"? We begin by listing the factors the
majority deemed to be necessary conditions for a belief or practice to
qualify as "religious" under the First Amendment. The belief or practice:
[1] Must not be based upon purely secular considerations;"
[2] Must not be based upon purely philosophical considerations,
such as Thoreau's;
[3] Must not be based upon purely personal preferences, such as
Thoreau's;
143. Id. at 216-217.
144. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment, 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (quoting Thomas v.
Review Bd. Of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981))."There is no doubt that
'[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause .... Purely secular
views do not suffice." Of course, this statement is not of much help without a prior systematic
clarification of the distinction between "religious" and "secular" views. Note that the Court
apparently acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a line in saying, "Nor do we underestimate the
difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular considerations." Id.
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[4] But rather must be based upon:
[a] deeply held preferences;
[b] which are intimately related to daily living; and
[c] shared by an organized group.145
There is another set of conditions that the Court thought relevant to the
issue whether Amish beliefs and practices qualified as "religious," but did
not make clear whether these additional factors are merely sufficient, rather
than necessary. Those factors are:
[1] The organized group is bound together by a reliance upon a
sacred scripture;
[2] The organized group's beliefs have remained constant over
significant span of time;
[3] The organized group's beliefs and practices are inherently simple
and uncomplicated;
[4] The organized group's beliefs and practices are markedly distinct
from the beliefs and practices of the surrounding society.
In light of these factors, does the secular physicalism of Richard
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, or Richard Lewontin, qualify as a "religion"
under the First Amendment? At least one proposition can be asserted with
confidence: since Dawkins and Dennett assert their comprehensive
physicalist worldviews as individuals, rather than asserting them as
members of an organized group, presumably their worldviews would not
qualify as religious under the Yoder analysis.
However, there may be an alternative state of affairs that does qualify.
Imagine a large, organized group established for the explicit purpose of
"maintaining, expanding, and promulgating the worldview of physicalism
and materialism, as articulated by Richard Dawkins." Imagine further that
these members regard themselves as bound by strict normative standards
for daily living, which they deem required by their worldview (e.g. being
obligated to preach the gospel of physicalism whenever opportunities
present themselves). Imagine even further that the members are
emotionally and intellectually related by a mutual reliance upon a certain
sacred scripture, such as the writings of Lucretius, Marx, Feuerbach,
145. Note, however, that in Franzee at footnote 76, the Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause protected a professed Christian, even though he did not claim to be a member of any
established religious community, church, or sect. This holding appears to negate Yoder's apparent
holding that belonging to an established religious community is a necessary condition for having a
religion within the meaning of the Religion Clauses.
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Nietzsche, Carnap, Quine, or Richard Dawkins. Would members of this
hypothetical group qualify as having a "religion"?
The answer is uncertain. The hypothetical group seems to satisfy many
of the Yoder criteria, but do they satisfy the apparently necessary condition
of not being based upon purely secular beliefs? Can a worldview shared by
a community of like-minded believers with a sacred scripture qualify as
"religious" if it is based upon a purely physicalistic metaphysics? Would
Yoder exclude it because it is grounded on purely secular presuppositions?
Perhaps not. Suppose that the members of this hypothetical group posit
an ungrounded ground of being: the universe of matter itself. Suppose
further that the members regularly participate in rituals in which they
rededicate themselves to pure materialism and sing ecologically-oriented
hymns to "Nature, Our Earthly Mother." It is now less clear that this
hypothetical group is purely "secular" under Yoder. The answer depends
upon what the Yoder Court meant by "secular." Since the Court made no
attempt to explicate the meaning "secular," any answer is uncertain. Thus,
Yoder did not definitively settle the meaning of "religion" under the First
Amendment.
c. Tentative summary on the Court's analyses of the meaning of
First Amendment's use of the term "religion."
At this point, the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's use of
the term "religion" is unclear. This is especially most apparent in the
question of whether an all-encompassing worldview based upon secular
physicalism qualifies as a religion. Secular physicialism may qualify under
the Seeger analysis, but may not under the Yoder analysis (although we
have raised questions about the latter). The question of whether the
Supreme Court would definitively hold that an all-encompassing, secular
physicalist worldview qualifies as a "religion" under the First Amendment
is distinct from the question whether the Court should so rule. The first
question raises an issue of mere prediction, whereas the second question
raises a normative issue of desirability or necessity. We shall return to this
question in the context of the issue of teaching evolution in public schools.
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d. How should "religion" be defined for purposes of the
Establishment Clause?146
There is a tendency in the Western philosophical and theological
traditions to answer the question of whether a given person has a religion or
is a religious person, by first determining whether that person believes at
least one religious proposition. This approach assumes that having a
religion comes to nothing more than accepting a religious proposition.
Presumably, the underlying strategy is based upon the assumption that the
problem of sorting abstract propositions into two subclasses-religious
propositions and non-religious propositions-is simpler than the problem of
sorting human beings into two subclasses - religious persons and non-
religious persons-together with the assumption that by solving the easier
problem the harder problem will also be solved.
This approach seems inadequate. One difficulty is that it is not easy to
sort all abstract propositions into the two subclasses-religious propositions
and non-religious propositions. There are apparently easy cases, such as the
proposition, God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ exists. Even in cases
of that kind one should always first ask, "but how exactly is that proposition
being used by a particular person in some particular context?" Putting aside
that difficulty about such "easy" cases, there are many difficult cases, cases
in which the question whether a particular proposition is a religious
proposition turns upon much more than the abstract content of that
proposition, where "much more" includes such things as: the particular
context of the speech, the speaker's intention, and the role the abstract
proposition plays in the speaker's life. Asking whether that abstract
proposition "everything is alright" is a religious or a non-religious
proposition is hopeless. The answer will vary according to the particular
context and speaker involved. The proposition, uttered at the end of a
successful 18-hole golf play, is probably not being used religiously. On the
other hand, that same proposition, uttered as the last words of a person on
his death-bed, could easily be used religiously.
However, setting aside problems of that sort, we move on to another
kind of difficulty. Imagine someone who can recite the Nicene Creed at a
moment's notice. Suppose further that this person asserts that she believes
every proposition of the Creed. However, suppose that her beliefs in the
truth of the Creed's propositions have absolutely no effect whatever on any
146. Some have proposed that the term 'religion' should be analyzed as having one sense, as
used in the Establishment Clause, and a different sense, as used in the Free Exercise Clause. We
reject this proposal on the ground that there is absolutely no textual basis in the First Amendment
for drawing such a distinction, to say nothing about the absence of any historical basis. In any
case, as Erwin Chemerinsky notes, the Supreme Court has not adopted the proposal.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, at 1187.
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other dimensions of her life, whether considered internally from a first-
person perspective or externally from a third-person perspective. She rarely
participates in Christian practices or worship, and when she does, she does
so solely to please relatives or friends. She does not deliberately conduct
her life in the light of any of the norms that are entailed or presupposed by
the assertions of the Creed. The propositions of the Creed play no role in
her intellectual, imaginative, emotional, or spiritual life, and so on.
Although this person may have some religion, she does not have a Christian
religion.
Thus, something more than simply believing at least one religious
proposition is necessary for having a religion. Believing at least one
religious proposition is a necessary condition for having a religion but is not
a sufficient condition. What more is needed?
We will use passages from Alfred North Whitehead and Huston Smith
to construct a definition of religion. Whitehead states:
But as between religion and arithmetic, other things are not equal.
You use arithmetic, but you are religious. Arithmetic of course
enters into your nature, so far as that nature involves a multiplicity
of things. But it is there as a necessary condition, and not as a
transforming agency. No one is invariably 'justified' by his faith in
the multiplication table. But in some sense or other, justification is
the basis of all religion. Your character is developed according to
your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which no one
can escape. Religion is force of belief cleansing the inward parts.
For this reason the primary religious virtue is sincerity, a
penetrating sincerity.
A religion, on its doctrinal side, can thus be defined as a system
of general truths which have the effect of transforming character
when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended.147
Similarly, Smith defines "religion" as "a way of life woven around a
people's ultimate concerns ' and situates the religious issue in people's
lives in this way:
Wherever people live, whenever they live, they find themselves
faced with three inescapable problems: how to win food and shelter
from their natural environment (the problem nature poses), how to
get along with one another (the social problem) and how to relate
themselves to the total scheme of things (the religious problem). 149
147. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, RELIGION IN THE MAKING 14-15 (New American Library
1974) (1926).
148. HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 183 (1958).
149. HUSTON SMITH, WHY RELIGION MATTERS 11 (2001).
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According to these passages, we shall say that having a religion
involves at least: [1] having at least one belief about the essential nature of
the World; [2] having at least one belief about one's essential mode of
relationship to that World; [3] having at least one belief about the modes of
thinking, attitudes, purposes, and conduct which are necessary, or at least
appropriate, given the beliefs of the first two categories; and [4]
systematically conforming one's modes of thinking, attitudes, purposes, and
conduct to the beliefs of the third category. We shall say that anyone who
satisfies conditions [1], [2], and [3] has a worldview and that anyone who
satisfies all four conditions has an integrated worldview. Thus, an
integrated worldview is generated by adding conforming practices to a set
of worldview beliefs. Integrated worldviews are worldviews plus
conforming practices. On the one hand, one might think an integrated
worldview is what one gets by adding a metaphysical account of reality to a
particular way of living. On the other hand, one might think of integrated
worldviews as what one would get by first enrolling in some philosophy
courses that evaluate different metaphysical accounts of reality, and then,
moving outside of the various course requirements, choosing one of those
metaphysical accounts as a guide for living.
It is important to avoid construing condition [1] (having at least one
belief about the essential nature of the World) in an overly narrow sense.
For example, it would be a mistake to restrict the class of beliefs about the
essential nature of the World to so-called "theistic" beliefs, where the
adjective "theistic" is used to describe worldviews which ascribe personal
characteristics to the Ground of Being. According to some accounts,
Hinduism and Buddhism do not ascribe personal characteristics to the
Ground of Being, although this seems to be an oversimplification. 5 ' Even
if such accounts were accurate, they would not suffice to exclude
practitioners of Hinduism and Buddhism from having religions in our sense.
Hindu and Buddhist beliefs about the nature of Reality are beliefs about the
essential nature of the World.
Another important point about our conditions is that they make no
attempt to distinguish between true religions and untrue religions, or
between coherent and incoherent religions. It is sometimes appropriate for
150. The general point is that both the Hindu and Buddhist traditions include emphases upon
both the impersonal and personal characteristics of the Ground of Being. See, e.g., EDWARD
CONZE, BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES 190-97 (1959); SMITH, supra note 82, at 61-63; A SOURCEBOOK
IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 272-73 (Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan & Charles A. Moore eds., Princeton
University Press 3d ed. 1970) (1957). The same holds for, say, the Christian tradition. See, e.g.,
THE CLOUD OF UNKNOWING (James Walsh trans., HarperCollins 2004); THEOLOGICA
GERMANICA (Susanna Winkworth trans., MacMillan and Co. 1937); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981); and the
writings of Nicholas of Cusa, and many others.
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those participating in various particular religions to make such evaluative
judgments for themselves. However, for purposes of defining the term
"religion," as it is used in the Establishment Clause, it would be a mistake
to draw such distinctions. Attempts to do so would presumably themselves
violate the Establishment Clause. It is not the business of courts to evaluate
the truth-value or efficacy of particular religions. The only appropriate issue
for the courts is determining whether a given individual has a religion, and
that issue can be resolved without getting into matters such as truth,
coherence, or efficacy.
Of course, there are typically many other characteristics of persons who
participate in a religion, such as engaging in communal rituals and liturgies,
revering certain traditional writings, engaging in organizational structures,
and many other things. However, we think that our four conditions suffice
to identify the minimal core of what it is to have a religion, which is to say,
have an integrated worldview.
Is secular physicalism a religion in the sense we have defined? It seems
so. It satisfies condition [1]: secular physicalists have at least one belief
about the essential nature of the World, namely, that it is purely physical,
which entails that there are no non-physical entities or causes. This belief
extends far beyond the scope of any possible physical experiment, as do the
succeeding beliefs of [2] and [3]. Such beliefs are not testable in any
narrow, positivistic sense.
With respect to condition [2], secular physicalists presumably must
believe that their essential mode of relationship to the World is that of one
physical entity to another. That belief entails the proposition that there are
no non-physical relations between themselves and any other entity in the
World, including the World itself. In particular, they must presumably
believe that there is no ultimate consciousness in the metaphysical
foundation of the World, no ultimate consciousness which grounds any
universal or transcendent meaning for human lives. Humans are ultimately
metaphysically alone in the World. There is no metaphysically foundational
element or entity in the World which can appropriately be addressed as
"You" or "Thou." 15'
With respect to condition [3], it seems that secular physicalists must
believe that the only attitudes, modes of thinking, purposes, and conduct
that are required by their beliefs regarding conditions [1] and [2] are modes
that reflect their beliefs that they themselves are nothing more than purely
physical entities in a purely physical World and that they are ultimately
metaphysically alone. These modes typically include such fundamental life-
151. See, e.g., MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1958) (1923).
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patterns as creating one's own individual meaning for life,15 fully
acknowledging and confronting the ultimate absurdity of existence,'53 and
so on.
154
Finally, regarding condition [4], secular physicalists who pursue an
integrated worldview must strive to conform their conduct to their condition
[3]-beliefs, such as striving to invent their own life-meanings, consciously
living in the face of ultimate metaphysical absurdity, and so on.
There is yet another way to argue that secular physicalism qualifies as a
religion. This argument focuses upon the cognitive operation of rejecting
propositions. First we must choose an integrated worldview which everyone
would concede to be a paradigmatic religion such as orthodox Christianity,
orthodox Islam, orthodox Judaism, etc. Call that integrated worldview
"IWV-I." Consider the proposition that IWV-l is the most appropriate
response to the ultimate question: "what is the ultimate nature of reality and
how should we live in the light of that ultimate nature?" Call that
proposition "P-I." Now consider a rejection of the proposition P-I, a
rejection which can be expressed as the negation of P-1. We maintain that
anyone asserting the negation of P-I should be regarded as asserting an
integrated worldview of his own, one he prefers. In short, rejections of
integrated worldviews are themselves integrated worldviews.
An alternative way of expressing this point is to say that the class of
integrated worldviews is closed-in the mathematical sense-under the
cognitive operation of rejection. The explanation for this closure is that the
ultimate question, "What is the ultimate nature of reality and how should
we live in the light of that ultimate nature?" cannot be avoided. It must be
answered in one way or another. In the famous terminology of William
James, it poses a forced option.'55 Even responses consisting of a rejection
of the ultimate question are themselves, although perhaps unwittingly,
responses to that same question. Think about the possible ways of rejecting
the question. On the one hand, one might maintain that reality has no
ultimate nature and that therefore the second question cannot intelligibly
arise, which, in turn, presumably entails the proposition that it does not
matter how we live. On the other hand, one might concede that reality has
152. See, e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956)
(1943) ; see also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
The Viking Press 1966) (1885); and FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1967) (1901).
153. See, e.g., ALBERT CAMuS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (Justin O'Brien trans., 1955) (1942).
Again, Nietzsche is one of the most important proponents of views of this kind.
154. See generally THE MEANING OF LIFE 65-295 (E.D. Klemke ed., 2d ed., 1999) (discussing
examples of all three of the foregoing alternative approaches).
155. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 3
(1956).
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an ultimate nature, but nevertheless still maintain that it does not matter
how we live, perhaps because reality "just does not care how we live." But
the assertion common to both responses-that it does not matter how we
live-is itself a normative prescription about how to live, namely, that one
ought not to concern oneself about the question. In addition, the first
response's denial that reality has an ultimate nature is itself an assertion
about that very nature, namely, that it is indecipherable. Necessarily, there
is such a thing as reality, even if reality should turn out to be entirely the
causal product of a single solipsistic consciousness, but if so, then reality
necessarily has an essence, even if that essence is being ultimately
indecipherable.
There is a third way of arguing that secular physicalism is a religion.
We begin again with the ultimate question. We then argue that any pattern
of thinking and living whatever necessarily constitutes a voluntary response
to that question, and that any such voluntary response to the question is
itself an integrated worldview, which is to say, a religion. That is, any
pattern of thinking and living can be understood, both from a third-person
and from a first-person perspective, as a response to the ultimate question,
and any such response itself constitutes an integrated worldview. But
secular physicalism constitutes a pattern of thinking and living. Hence,
secular physicalism is a response.to the ultimate question and is therefore
an integrated worldview-a religion.
3. The challenged governmental action must have a secular objective.
We return to the analysis of the three-part Lemon test, whose
application in any given instance presupposes that a religion is involved.
The first Lemon element requires that the challenged governmental action
have a secular objective.'56 We shall refer to it as the "secular-objective
criterion." Obviously, the use of the term "secular" is intended to
distinguish "secular" from "religious" purposes. As mentioned above, the
Court has refused to draw a clear distinction between the meanings of these
two terms.
One of the major issues is the lack of clarity in the secular-objective
criterion itself. We assume that, in at least the vast majority of cases, any
particular human action is directed at a plurality of objectives. Given this
background fact, how should the criterion be understood? Suppose that a
particular act of a governmental agent is aimed at, say, six objectives. Is the
Establishment Clause violated if just one of those six objectives is religious
156. We broaden the language of Lemon to include any governmental action, whether it be
legislative in nature or not. This expansion is in accord with the Court's general approach to the
interpretation of its language in Lemon. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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in nature? Or, is it violated if and only if all of the objectives are religious in
nature? Or, is it violated if and only if the objective which is most important
to the agent himself religious in nature?
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the intended meaning of the
secular-objective criterion can be clarified in those respects, there would
then arise a plethora of epistemological issues of correctly identifying each
objective pursued by any particular governmental agent in any particular
context.'57 These epistemological issues are just special cases of a more
general set-that of correctly identifying every one of the objectives
pursued by any human agent in any particular context. Given any particular
action of any particular human agent in any particular context, how can
courts accurately identify each of the objectives that agent was pursuing in
that context by means of that action? Notice that no matter how the secular-
objective criterion is construed in terms of the alternative interpretations
just specified, it must be at least possible to accurately identify all of the
objectives pursued by means of any particular human action.
However, even supposing that this task can be successfully carried out,
how can courts identify an agent's priority ranking of those objectives, in
the event that the secular-objective criterion is interpreted as requiring such
a value ranking? Which, among an agent's plurality of objectives, does she
deem most important?
Assuming that these epistemological issues can be satisfactorily
resolved, another issue is whether an application of the secular-objective
criterion is too strong, in the sense of expressing hostility toward
religiously-motivated governmental agents. It seems that the most efficient
way to prevent governmental agents from taking into consideration their
religious convictions in performing public roles would be to prevent
religiously-minded people from participating in government at all. If such
persons are allowed to serve in governmental roles, they will inevitably take
their religious motivations into account in performing those roles. For
example, religiously-minded legislators will at least sometimes pray for
divine guidance before voting on a measure. Or, like Thomas Jefferson,
they might even be inclined to utter metaphysically intemperate sentences
incorporating phrases such as, "endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights."'5 8 Simply enacting rules prohibiting them from relying
upon their religious motivations would be ineffective. Religiously-
motivated persons would have to be excluded from public roles. But that
157. For illuminating discussions of some of the difficulties inherent in judicially ascertaining
legislative intent, see, e.g., Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987), and then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Kassel v. Consol. Freighways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
158. The Declaration of Independence, 2 (U.S. 1776).
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consequence seems outrageous, at least to some.59
However, an even more fundamental issue is whether the secular-
objective criterion has any conceptually appropriate role to play in the
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. One might think not, possibly
because of the arbitrary way in which the criterion would apply across the
board. Imagine that the President of the United States performs a particular
governmental act with the ultimate objective to do God's will. In order to
put aside difficult Seeger questions about distinguishing between religious
and secular beliefs, suppose that the President is an orthodox Christian of a
paradigmatic kind. Presumably, the President's governmental action would
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause because it is intentionally
aimed at an ultimate religious objective. Now contrast that hypothetical
situation with one in which another President performs the very same
governmental action as the earlier President did but without the religious
motivation. In contrast to the earlier President's action, the later President's
action would not violate the Establishment Clause. Such an outcome is
unreasonable and arbitrary.
This hypothetical raises the question of why a governmental actor's
motivations should matter at all, when it comes to deciding whether that
action violates the Establishment Clause. It seems that the only appropriate
way to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated is to
ask whether the challenged governmental action establishes a religion. If it
does, the Clause has been violated, regardless of the motivations of the
governmental actor responsible. For example, the Clause should be deemed
violated even if the governmental actor is not motivated by a religious
consideration but rather by a politically-authoritarian passion to keep the
ignorant masses in line to promote the efficacy of rule by autocratic
government.
4. The challenged governmental action must not have a principal or
primary effect which either advances or inhibits religion.
The second Lemon criterion asks whether the challenged governmental
action has a principal or primary effect that either advances or inhibits
religion. If it does, the action violates the Establishment Clause. This is the
Lemon criterion the Court has most frequently used to strike down
governmental actions under the Establishment Clause. Like the first Lemon
criterion, this one is also a puzzle. We shall take up only a few of many
possible issues.
159. But perhaps not to all. For example, consider the logical implications of the popular
thesis that "religious" discourse must be excluded from the "public square." What better way to
accomplish that objective than to simply exclude the makers of religious discourse from the public
square themselves?
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We shall focus upon the criterion's use of the verb "advances," rather
than upon its use of the verb "inhibits." Using the latter term to interpret the
Establishment Clause creates an overlap between the scope of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise
Clause has the function of prohibiting governmental efforts to "inhibit"
religious activities. Inserting the same prohibition in the Establishment
Clause causes a redundancy.
Of course, the criterion's use of the term "religion" brings along with it
all of the issues about that term we have already discussed. To the extent
that the meaning of "religion" is unclear, so is the second Lemon criterion.
What does "effect" mean? It seems that the Court must be referring to
causal consequences. But causal consequences of what? Presumably, causal
consequences of a governmental action. But what does principal or primary
effect mean? The Court couldn't intelligibly mean intended effects, because
that meaning-intention would reduce the second Lemon criterion to the first
criterion, rendering the second redundant. The Principle of Charity requires
that one avoid assigning to an obscure passage an interpretation that makes
the passage silly, unless such a meaning assignment is the only possible
interpretation. So, we should look further.
Perhaps what the Court means by "principal or primary effects" of a
governmental action is the largest class of consequences of that action. But
what would that mean? The answer isn't clear. Imagine a governmentally-
operated nuclear power plant which explodes because of governmental
negligence. Suppose that the causal consequences of the explosion include
3,000 people killed, 15,000 people wounded, 10-billion dollars of property
damage, and 100-billion dollars of damage to the environment. Which of
these classes of consequences is the largest class? The answer isn't clear
because we don't know the answer to the question, "largest with respect to
what criterion or measure?" The largest monetary amount of
consequences? The largest number of human beings affected? The most
important consequences?
But there seems to be no answer to such questions because the Court
has not attempted to answer it. It has simply tossed into the river of
constitutional interpretation the phrase "principal or primary effect" with
the apparent, but mistaken, assumption that its intended meaning will be
clear to competent readers.
Suppose there is an intelligible answer to the question, "what does the
Court mean by the "primary or principal" set of causal consequences of a
governmental action?" Other difficult questions would then arise. For
example, suppose that a particular governmental action causes at least two
classes of consequences, each of which is equal in weight (however that
term is construed) to the other. Are both of these classes primary or
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principal effects of the action? If so, what are we to make of the Court's
apparent assumption that, given any particular governmental action, there is
necessarily just one principal or primary effect? Dialectical reflections of
this kind could be extended indefinitely.
We move on to other issues. The second Lemon criterion presupposes
that courts are capable of accurately identifying all of the causal
consequences of any particular governmental action. But the Court offers
no argument to persuade us of the truth of that presupposition. Indeed, one
might well be skeptical about any such argument, given the apparent fact
that no one, judges or otherwise, seem well-equipped to make such
identifications.
Assuming, hypothetically, that the Court is able to determine the
meaning of "principal or primary effect," there remain problems with the
second Lemon criterion. The second criterion presupposes not only that
courts are capable of accurately identifying all of the causal consequences
of any particular governmental action, but also of extracting from the class
of the total causal consequences that subclass whose membership makes up
the primary or principal causal consequences. However, even assuming the
formulation of some intelligible and empirically-confirmable criterion for
applying the term "primary or principal effect," why should we assume that
judges are well-equipped to make the measurements and calculations
required to apply such a criterion?
The apparent implications of the second criterion present even more
difficulties. They are potentially incoherent and at least arbitrary. As to
potential incoherence, imagine a governmental program that severely
restricts orthodox Christians from participating in political process, whether
by running for office or voting. Suppose that, instead accomplishing the
program's intended objective, the "primary or principal causal effect" is, in
fact, a massive public rejection of the government's attempt to throttle the
political power of orthodox Christians. In fact, suppose that the primary
causal consequence of the government's program is an unprecedented and
overwhelming conversion of large numbers of Americans to orthodox
Christianity. Presumably, the Court would have to rule that the
government's anti-Christian program violates the second Lemon criterion
because its "primary or principle" effect is that of assisting the cause of
religion. This consequence seemingly illustrates the potential incoherence
of the second Lemon criterion itself. As to potential arbitrariness, consider
the chaotic sequence of the aid-to-religious-school cases. It is difficult to
imagine a more arbitrary and unpredictable set ofjudicial rulings. 160
160. See, e.g., John E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1429-58 (7th
ed. 2004) (providing an overview of these cases).
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Finally, the potential implications of the second criterion could exhibit
a deep hostility to religiously-motivated conduct. Given the ambiguity of
the noun "religion," as used in the phrase "advancing or inhibiting
religion," and the ambiguity inherent in the linguistic formulation of the
second criterion, that criterion could easily, and perhaps already does, serve
as a disguise for anti-theistic judicial rulings. For example, the second
criterion could be used to prohibit governmental officials from publicly
displaying religious beliefs, such as the common presidential practice of
holding prayer breakfasts with people like Billy Graham. Similarly, the
criterion could be used to prohibit governmental officials from publicly
attending religious services or from publicly acknowledging personal
religious convictions. Such actions would presumably run afoul of the
second Lemon criterion, and the Establishment Clause insofar as they would
have a primary effect that advances religious causes.
5. The challenged governmental action must not create an excessive
entanglement on the part of government with religious
activities.
Additionally, the third creates the risk of a Catch-22 dilemma with
respect to the primary-effect criterion of Lemon. On the one hand, if there is
insufficient protection against the diversion of governmental assistance to
religion, then there is a substantial chance that the Court would hold that the
primary-effect criterion has been violated. On the other hand, if there is
sufficient protection against such diversion, in the form of oversight
functions and processes, then there is a substantial chance that the Court
would hold that the entanglement test has been violated.
6. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on our criticisms of the Lemon standard of review, we
recommend that the Court discard the Lemon standard altogether. In its
place, we propose the substitution of a standard of review we shall refer to
as the "No-Discrimination Standard of Review." According to that
standard, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted as prohibiting
government, at any level, from discriminating among the members of the
class of integrated worldviews, as we have defined that class and where
secular physicalism qualifies as an integrated worldview.
Recall that we earlier defined the class of integrated worldviews in
terms of four conditions: [1] having at least one belief about the essential
nature of the world, [2] having at least one belief about one's essential
mode of relationship to the world, [3] having at least one belief about the
modes of thinking, attitudes, purposes, and conduct which are necessary, or
at least appropriate, given the beliefs associated with the first two
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conditions, and [4] systematically conforming one's actual modes of
thinking, attitudes, purposes, and conduct to the beliefs associated with the
third condition. Thus, we propose that the standard of review under the
Establishment Clause prohibit government, at any level, from
discriminating among the members of the class of integrated worldviews.
For example, government would violate the Establishment Clause under our
proposed standard of review if it prohibited at least one integrated
worldview (e.g., theism) from expressing itself in a particular forum while
permitting at least one other integrated worldview (e.g., secular
physicalism) to express itself in that same forum.
Recall also that we defined the class of worldviews as views that satisfy
just the first three of the abovementioned four conditions. Assuming, at
least in many situations, that condition [4] would be satisfied if the first
three conditions were also satisfied. We also propose that government
should not be permitted to discriminate even among worldviews. If this
were not the case, and the government was permitted to discriminate among
worldviews, it would inevitably discriminate among integrated worldviews.
For example, if government at some level discriminated against, say,
theistic worldviews, in favor of secular physicalist worldviews, then-
assuming that most persons who have theistic worldviews also have
integrated theistic worldviews-the discrimination would effectively also
discriminate against integrated theistic worldviews.
I. The Court's Evolution Cases
We shall now analyze the Court's two major cases dealing with
teaching evolutionary theory in public schools as well as our own proposal.
a. Our own proposal
The proposal for which we shall later present a more in depth argument
is that a state statute, school-district regulation, or school-district practice
that permits, but does not require, public-school teachers to incorporate
non-physicalist accounts of life in their science classes does not violate the
Establishment clause. Our proposal is notably different from the legislation
struck down in the two cases discussed below in that it would neither
prohibit teaching the Darwinian physicalist theory of evolution (as in the
first case), nor require teaching non-physicalist theories of life whenever the
Darwinian theory is presented (as in the second case).
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b. Epperson v. Arkansas
In Epperson v. Arkansas6' the Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas
statute prohibiting teachers in any State-supported school or university from
teaching "the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a
lower order of animals," or using "in any such institution a textbook that
teaches" that theory.162 A violation of the statute was a misdemeanor and
subjected violators to dismissal.
Epperson v. Arkansas involved teaching biology in a Little Rock high
school. Prior to the events giving rise to the litigation, the official high
school biology textbook did not contain any material dealing with the
Darwinian theory of evolution. However, for the academic year 1965-
1966--conforming to a recommendation from biology teachers in the
district-the Little Rock School administration adopted a biology textbook
containing a chapter discussing "the theory about the origin... of man from
a lower form of animal."' 63 Epperson, a 1 t'-grade biology teacher, brought
an action, seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional and an
order enjoining the State and the School District from dismissing her.
The Court expressed its general interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in these words:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion. "
The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause on the
ground that it had been enacted for a religious purpose, thereby invoking a
criterion that would be formulated, three-years later, as the first element of
the Lemon test:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of
knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole
reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious
doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of
Genesis by particular religious group.165
Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.
161. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
162. Id. at 98-99.
163. Id. at 99.
164. Id. at 103-04.
165. Id. at 103.
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Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and
universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was
confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its
supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. 1
66
[T]here can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its
teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is
contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the
exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion
has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some
of its citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction
was and is the law's reason for existence."1 67
The statute was the result of a 1928 popular initiative. As evidence for
its conclusion that the statute had been enacted for a religious objective, the
Court quoted from a religiously-oriented newspaper advertisement and
religiously-oriented published letters written in support of the initiative. 1
68
c. Edwards v. Aguillard
In Edwards v. Aguillard 69 the Court struck down as a violation of the
Establishment Clause a Louisiana statute mandating the teaching of both
Creation science and evolution. The statute prohibited teaching the theory
of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by the teaching of
"creation science." Although the statue did not require teaching either
evolution or creation science, it did require that, if either was taught, so
must the other. The State officials charged with enforcing the statute
argued that the statute's objective was promoting the Constitutionally-
permissible, secular interest of academic freedom.
The Court began its analysis of the Act by invoking the three-part
Lemon test 7' and noting that it was especially motivated to find
Establishment Clause violations in public-school contexts:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary
schools. Families entrust public schools with the education of their
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views
that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or
her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and
166. Id. at 109.
167. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-08.
168. Id. at 109 n. 16.
169. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
170. Id. at 582-83.
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their attendance is involuntary .... The State exerts great authority
and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements,
and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models
and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure .... Furthermore,
"[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools. 171
The Court contrasted the application of the Establishment Clause to
primary and secondary public schools with its application to post-secondary
public education:
The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard
to college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. 'This
distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results.'. . . Thus,
for instance, the Court has not questioned the authority of state
colleges and universities to offer courses on religion or theology.172
The Court maintained that applying the first Lemon criterion requires
asking whether the "actual purpose" of the Government's challenged action
is either the endorsement or the disapproval of religion. 173 Of course, the
Court's assumption in this regard is that the Establishment Clause prohibits
both governmental endorsement and governmental disapproval of religion,
where secular physicalism is not deemed to be a religion. This formulation
presupposes the existence of a third alternative to the dichotomy of
endorsement, on the one hand, and disapproval, on the other. For, if there is
no third alternative, then the First Amendment would be violated no matter
what a State or School District did about the matter, an absurd consequence.
But is the Court's belief in a third alternative correct?
One might easily suppose that there is a third alternative: neither
endorsing nor disapproving religion. However, the matter is less clear, at
least in the context of teaching in public schools. It seems that however a
state or school district addresses this particular issue, its action will
inevitably violate the Court's maxim. Consider the available alternatives
and the inherent problems with each.
Alternative [1] - Prohibit all teaching of evolution, whether from a
secular Darwinian physicalist viewpoint, or from a non-physicalist
viewpoint, which the Court would classify as a "religious" viewpoint. This
alternative would violate the Court's maxim because it would involve
"disapproving" religion.
171. Id. at 583-584 (quoting Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. Of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)).
172. Id. at 584 n.5 (quoting School Distrist of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253
(1963)).
173. Id. at 585.
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Alternative [2] - Permit the teaching of evolution from both a secular
physicalist viewpoint and a non-physicalist viewpoint. This alternative
would violate the Court's maxim because it would involve "endorsing"
religion.
Alternative [3] - Permit the teaching of evolution from a secular
physicalist viewpoint, but prohibit teaching it from a non-physicalist
viewpoint. That alternative would violate the Court's maxim because it
would involve "disapproving" religion.
Alternative [4] - Permit the teaching of evolution from a non-physicalist
viewpoint, but prohibit teaching it from a secular physicalist viewpoint.
This alternative would violate the Court's maxim because it would involve
"endorsing" religion.
These logical consequences show the source of the difficulties is the
Court's maxim. When interpreted literally, the maxim exhibits internal
incoherence.
The Court went on to say that a governmental intention to promote a
religious objective may be evidenced in either of two ways - either by
promoting "religion in general" or by promoting a "particular religious
belief." Consequently, if a governmental action aims at promoting a
religious objective in either of these two ways, it violates the Establishment
Clause regardless of whether the challenged legislation meets the second
and third Lemon criteria.'74 Of course, this maxim is as clear as the Court's
definition of "religion," which is to say, not at all.
It is instructive to compare this analysis of the Court's maxim with the
maxim cited in Epperson: that the Establishment Clause prohibits both
governmental discrimination between religions and between religions and
non-religions, where secular physicalism is deemed to be non-religion. Are
these two maxims equivalent, at least with respect to the issue of teaching
evolution in public schools? It seems that they are not. If we apply the
analysis we just used on the first maxim to the second maxim, we get the
following results:
Alternative (1): Prohibit all teaching of evolution, whether from a
secular physicalist perspective or from a non-physicalist viewpoint. It
seems that this prohibition would not violate the second maxim, although it
would probably violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Alternative (2): Permit the teaching of evolution from both a secular
physicalist perspective and from a non-secular non-physicalist perspective.
Presumably, this would not violate the second maxim because there would
be no governmental discrimination between religions or between religions
and non-religions.
174. Id.
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Alternative (3): Permit the teaching of evolution from a secular
physicalist viewpoint, but prohibit teaching it from a non-secular non-
physicalist viewpoint. It seems that this alternative would violate the second
maxim because it would involve governmental discrimination between
religions and non-religions, in favor of the latter.
Alternative (4): Permit the teaching of evolution from a non-physicalist
viewpoint, but prohibit teaching it from a secular physicalist viewpoint.
Presumably, this would also violate the standard because it would involve
governmental discrimination between religions and non-religions, in favor
of the former.
Thus, it seems that the two maxims are not equivalent. We set aside the
difference in outcomes under Alternative (1), because both outcomes would
result in unconstitutionality, albeit for different reasons. However, the
difference in outcomes under Alternative (2) is decisive. In Alternative (2),
the outcome of the first maxim is unconstitutionality and that of the second
is constitutionality.
It seems that this non-equivalence is due to the fact that the second
maxim is formulated in broader terms than the first, in that the second
includes non-religious, as well as religious, points of view. Nevertheless,
both maxims can be faulted for failing to recognize secular physicalism as
an integrated worldview in its own right, a failure which is remedied by our
proposed No-Discrimination standard-of-review under the Establishment
Clause, a standard which presupposes that secular physicalism is an
integrated worldview.
The Court went on to address the argument raised by the defense: that
the statute's stated purpose was that of protecting academic freedom. The
Court distinguished two possible senses of "academic freedom." On the
one hand, the term might be construed as meaning the promotion and
protection of the liberty of public-school teachers to teach as they wish.
With respect to that interpretation, the Court maintained that the statute was
not designed to promote that objective, 175 offering four reasons for so
concluding:
(1) The concept of academic freedom has no application in this
particular context because under state law public-school teachers have no
academic freedom in this regard. The Court argued that the contents of
public-school courses are defined and required by the Louisiana Board of
Education and therefore public-school teachers are not legally free to teach
courses differing from the State's requirements.1 7
6
(2) The legal coercion inherent in the statute's sanctions is incompatible
175. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 586.
176. Id. at 586 n.6.
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with the objective of promoting academic freedom by requiring the teaching
of creation science whenever the Darwinian theory is taught. This means
that, instead of promoting academic freedom, the statute actually diminishes
that freedom by restricting teachers' liberty to teach Darwinian evolution
without also teaching creation science.177
(3) The legislative history shows that the statute's legislative sponsor
intended to narrow the scope of the public-school science curriculum.
Senator Keith said, "My preference would be that neither [creationism nor
evolution] be taught." A prohibition of that kind would actually frustrate the
accomplishment of the goal of ensuring a comprehensive education.'78
(4) The statute does not give public-school teachers any liberty that did
not already have under state law. The Court approved the Court of Appeals'
finding that Louisiana law already permitted teachers to present any
scientific theory, other that Darwinian evolution, about the origins of life on
earth. There was testimony at trial that "[a]ny scientific concept that's based
on established fact can be included in our curriculum already, and no
legislation allowing this is necessary."' 79 Thus, because the statute fails to
give teachers any new powers, the statute does not achieve its stated
purpose of promoting academic freedom.
This last argument is somewhat startling. The Court seemed to maintain
that, under state law, public-school teachers already had the legal power to
teach creation science. If so, then presumably a statute which permitted,
rather than required, the teaching of creation science would be
constitutional. Whether the Court intended to imply this might be
questioned, however, given the qualification that such alternative theories
must be "based on established fact." However, even given this qualification,
the Court seemed to leave the door open for non-physicalist accounts of life
which are "based on established fact" in some significant sense. On the
other hand, given the Court's strong tendency to strike down statutes which
are motivated by religious, especially Christian, concerns, one wonders
whether it would strike down even such a "permission" statute, if Christians
were among its supporters. We shall return to this issue later.
On the other hand, the Court said that the phrase "academic freedom"
could be interpreted in terms of a principle of fundamental fairness,
requiring that all the available evidence be taught. However, the Court said
that, even if the term "academic freedom" is understood as meaning that all
of the available evidence regarding the origin of human beings ought to be
taught, the statute does not promote that objective either: "[t]he goal of
177. Id.
178. Id. at 587.
179. Id.
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providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either
by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of
creation science.""'8 The statute required the development of curriculum
guides for teaching creation science but not for teaching Darwinian
evolution. The statute required that resource services be supplied for
teaching creation science but not for teaching evolution. Only creation
scientists were permitted to serve on the committee supplying such resource
services. The statute prohibited discrimination against any teacher choosing
to teach creation science but did not protect teachers choosing to teach
Darwinian evolution or any other non-creation science theory, or teachers
who simply refused to teach creation science.'8'
The Court went on to say:
If the Louisiana Legislature's purpose was solely to maximize the
comprehensive-ness and effectiveness of science instruction, it
would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about
the origins of humankind. But under the Act's requirements,
teachers who were once free to teach any and all facets of this
subject are now unable to do so. Moreover, the Act fails even to
ensure that creation science will be taught, but instead requires the
teaching of this theory only when the theory of evolution is
taught. 8 2
Thus, the Court argued that the statute's purpose is not to protect academic
freedom, in the sense of teaching all of the available evidence, but rather to
discredit the Darwinian theory by countering it with the creation science
account.'83
Again, we note the Court's implied commitment to the proposition that
a statute which simply permits, rather than requires, the teaching of non-
Darwinian accounts of would be constitutional. We shall return to this
implied commitment later.
Turning from its focus upon the statute's officially-stated purpose of
promoting "academic freedom," the Court maintained that the legislature's
primary purpose in enacting the statute was religious, given the "historic
and contemporaneous link between the teachings of certain religious
denominations and the teaching of evolution."' 84 Given such a sociological
link, it is not necessary for such a statute to state a primary religious
purpose.8 5 The primary legislative purpose was to promote the "religious"
180. Id. at 586.
181. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 588.
182. Id. at 588-89.
183. Id. at 589.
184. Id. at 590.
185. Id.
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doctrine that a "supernatural being created humankind."' 86 In fact, the very
term "creation science" was defined as promoting that doctrine by
supporters of the legislation who testified in the legislative hearings."8 7
Hence, the legislative history of the statute clearly shows that "the term
'creation science,' as contemplated by the legislature which enacted the
statute, embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was
responsible for the creation of humankind. 1 88
In addition, the Court argued that it was no coincidence that the
legislature required the teaching of a theory that "coincides" with the
religious view that a supernatural being created humankind. The legislative
history shows that the legislature's primary purpose was to "change the
science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive
advantage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of
evolution in its entirety." ' 9
The Court summed up its arguments against the Act in these words:
[T]he purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the science
curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint. Out of
many possible science subjects taught in the public schools, the
legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one scientific theory
that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects. As in
Epperson, the legislature passed the Act to give preference to those
religious groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of
humankind by a divine creator. The 'overriding fact' that
confronted the Court in Epperson was 'that Arkansas law selects
from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it
proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with... a
particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular
religious group.' . . . Similarly, the Creationism Act is designed
either to promote the theory of creation science which embodies a
particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be
taught whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a
scientific theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding
the teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught.
The Establishment Clause, however, 'forbids alike the preference of
a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma.' ... Because the primary
purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious
belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First
186. Id.at 591.
187. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 591-92.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 592.
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Amendment.'9"
However, the Court went on to state a significant qualification, much like
the two earlier qualifications we have already noted:
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not mean
that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that
the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the
history of Western Civilization.... In a similar way, teaching a
variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind might
be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the
effectiveness of science instruction. But because the primary
purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious
doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 9' [Emphasis added.]
Thus, we see again that the Court apparently concedes the constitutionality
of a statute, or even a practice, for that matter, which permits, without
requiring, the teaching of alternative theories of life, including non-
physicalist theories.
d. Evaluation of the Court's evolution cases
From our perspective, the Court's evolution cases can be faulted on at
least the following grounds:
First, the Court's reliance upon the first Lemon criterion-no religious
purpose-is a serious deficiency. As we have argued, regardless of what
ought to be done about the second and third Lemon criteria, the first
element is particularly objectionable. And, eliminating the reliance upon the
first Lemon element would undercut both opinions, at least as written.
Second, the Court's implicit assumption that the theory of Darwinian
evolution, if presented with the presupposition that a secular physicalist
metaphysics is not itself an integrated worldview, is mistaken. As we have
argued, it is-at least in its typical academic incarnations. Thus, the Court's
holdings in these cases constitute a violation of the No-Discrimination
standard of review we have proposed for interpreting and applying the
Establishment Clause.
Third, the second failure is itself a function of the Court's refusal to
give a systematic general definition of the term "religion" for purposes of
the First Amendment.
190. Id. at 593 (quoting Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103, 106-07 (1968)).
191. Id. at 593-594.
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Fourth, in Aguillard the Court failed to formulate the essential content
of the Establishment Clause in a way which avoids incoherence.
On the other hand, in neither Epperson nor Aguillard was the Court
presented with the issues raised by our proposal: the Establishment Clause
would not be violated by a rule or practice that merely permitted, without
requiring, the presentation of non-physicalist accounts of the origin of life.
Indeed, not only was the Court not confronted with a proposal like ours,
but, as we have pointed out, there are three passages in Aguillard which
implicitly show that, even assuming the application of the Lemon criteria,
the Court would be willing to uphold a proposal like ours under the
Establishment Clause. From our point of view that particular implication is
a welcome one.
IV. Significant Lower Federal-Court Cases
We shall briefly take up two lower federal court cases that have figured
prominently in discussions of the evolution issue: McLean v. Arkansas
Board of Education; '92 and Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District.93
1. McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education
In McLean the district court struck down under the Establishment
Clause an Arkansas statute requiring public schools to give "balanced
treatment" both to "creation science" and to "evolution science."' 94 We
shall focus upon just a few especially significant aspects.
a. Unfortunate reliance upon the Lemon test
First, the district court relied exclusively upon the Lemon test, holding
that the challenged statute violated all three of the Lemon criteria. Of
course, the fact that the court applied Lemon is perfectly reasonable, given
that, as a lower federal court, it was obliged to follow applicable Supreme
Court precedents. However, given our previously-stated opposition to the
Lemon standard of review, we do not regard the McLean decision as
philosophically right.
b. An inadequate characterization of the two-model approach
Second, the district court criticized what it called the "two-model
approach" to the question of explaining life. Because we have already
analyzed the court's criticism in greater detail in Part I, we will take it up
briefly here. One of the major problems with the court's analysis of this
192. 529 F.Supp. 1255 (D. Ark. 1982).
193. 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995).
194. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1256.
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two-model approach is that it described approach in two notably different
ways. On the one hand, it characterized the approach as maintaining that
"there are only two positions with respect to the origins of the earth and
life: belief in the inerrancy of the Genesis story of creation and of a
worldwide flood as fact, or belief in what they call evolution";'95 and the
court later stated that the two-model approach is "an extension of
Fundamentalists' view that one must either accept the literal interpretation
of Genesis or else believe in the godless system of evolution."' 96 On the
other hand, the court characterized the two-model approach as assuming
"only two explanations for the origins of life and existence of men, plants
and animals: It was either the work of a creator or it was not."' 197
These two characterizations of the two-model account of life are
importantly different. According to the first characterization-which holds
that either the Genesis account of life is true, or the secular Darwinian
account is true-the two-model approach fails to specify an exhaustive
dichotomy of alternative hypotheses as to the explanation of life.
Obviously, the Genesis account is not the only available non-physicalist
account of life. In contrast, according to the second characterization-
which holds that either life was the work of a non-physical Creator, or it
was not-the two-model approach does specify an exhaustive dichotomy of
alternative hypotheses of life. The second characterization essentially
distinguishes between those accounts of life that posit at least one non-
physical cause and explanation, and those accounts that do not. Thus, the
two characterizations of the two-model approach are not equivalent.
However, one might ask, "even if you're right about the court's
mistake, why does the mistake matter? What harm does it do?" The court's
mistake completely vitiates the conclusion it drew from its equivocating
characterization of the two-model approach. The court maintained that
"[a]pplication of these two-models, according to creationists, and the
defendants, dictates that all scientific evidence which fails to support the
theory of evolution is necessarily scientific evidence in support of
creationism and is, therefore, creation science 'evidence' in support of
Section 4(a)."' 98 In dismissing this argument as fallacious, the court clearly
relied upon its first characterization of the two-model approach. If the
alternatives are simply the truth of the Genesis account or the truth of
Darwinian physicalism, then it is not the case that any evidence tending to
cast doubt upon the truth of Darwinian physicalism is evidence that
necessarily strengthens the case for the truth of the Genesis account. The
195. Id. at 1260.
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reason is obvious. The Genesis account of the origins of life is but one of
many possible non-physicalist accounts.
In contrast, if the alternatives are stated as the court did in its second
formulation-either the truth of at least one non-physicalist account of life,
or the truth of at least one physicalist account of life-then the outcome is
dramatically different. Given the mutually exclusive and exhaustive
statement of the alternatives, then any evidence tending to cast doubt upon
the truth of any purely physicalist account would necessarily strengthen the
case for the truth of at least one non-physicalist account. That is precisely
the kind of evidence we have marshaled in the first part of this essay.
c. An overly narrow definition of 'evolutionary theory'
The district court maintained that there is no conflict between
evolutionary theory and non-physicalist accounts of life. The court's
argument for that proposition relied upon a narrow definition of
"evolutionary theory." In that regard, the court said:
The emphasis on origins as an aspect of the theory of evolution is
peculiar to creationist literature. Although the subject of origins of
life is within the province of biology, the scientific community does
not consider origins of life a part of evolutionary theory. The theory
of evolution assumes the existence of life and is directed to an
explanation of how life evolved. Evolution does not presuppose the
absence of a creator or God and the plain inference conveyed by
Section 4 is erroneous. 199
But this is an overly narrow definition of "evolutionary theory." As we
have argued in Part I, typical presentations of Darwinian evolutionary
theory go far beyond the scope of the court's definition. Indeed, typical
presentations incorporate not only strictly biological assertions, but also
metaphysical assertions, such as the metaphysical claim that there simply
are no non-physical causes in the universe. When Darwinian evolutionary
theory is understood to include such a philosophical underpinning of
secular metaphysical physicalism, the conflict between that theory and non-
physicalist accounts of the origin life should be obvious.
d An overly narrow definition of "science"
In the course of arguing that "creation science" is not science, the Court
proposed a definition of the term "science." One of the elements of the
definition was that the assertions and theories of science are "falsifiable,"2 °°
199. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1266. See the Court's remark that "evolution is not a religion
and.., teaching evolution does not violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1274.
200. Id. at 1267.
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meaning that it makes at least one definite prediction that is capable of
being empirically tested and shown to be mistaken. If such a prediction
turns out to be false, the assertion or theory has been falsified but a
scientific assertion or theory is falsifiable merely if it could be falsified.2"'
This definition is too narrow to capture even what everyone
uncontroversially regards as science.
The general philosophical consensus is that, if the criterion of
falsifiablity were taken seriously, much of what is considered paradigmatic
science would have to be discarded.2"2 Thus, the Court's attempt to
distinguish between "creation science" and "genuine science" misfires.
There may be ways of coherently distinguishing the two, but invoking the
criterion of falsifiability is not one of them.
A similar mistake runs through part of the unpublished opinion in
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005).203 The District Court's
discussion in Section 4 ("Whether ID is Science") relies upon an overly-
narrow characterization of science in terms of what the Court calls
"methodological naturalism," a term it defines as a principle limiting
scientific explanations to only those propositions which can be physically
tested and verified. As we have argued, this is not an accurate description of
the way in which science actually proceeds. Science often posits hypotheses
which cannot be tested in any such narrow sense. However, even if it were
an accurate characterization of science, it would not suffice to preclude at
least the invocation of non-physicalist explanations of life in classrooms.
Any responsible science teacher who conforms to such an overly-narrow
view of science would be intellectually obligated to make students aware
that science limits itself to physical testability in an extremely narrow sense
and therefore is constitutionally incapable of evaluating hypotheses about
the nature of reality that invoke non-physical causes, hypotheses which
might in fact be true. At that point, it would presumably be ad hoc and
artificial to refuse to respond to students' inevitable questions about the
nature of such non-physicalist explanations and even if some science
teachers did resort to such ad hoc boundary stipulations, they would at least
have put students on notice that science, as they understand it, is surely not
the last word about the ultimate nature of reality. Such concessions would
themselves constitute a significant educational advance.2"
201. See, e.g., SAMIR OKASHA, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13
(2002).
202. Id. at 13 - 17. See also ALEXANDER BIRD, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 239-47 (1998);
ROBERT KLEE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: CUTTING NATURE AT ITS
SEAMS 67-73 (1997).
203. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M. D. Pa. 2005).
204. The topic of "methodological naturalism" involves difficult questions of interpretation
and analysis. We remind readers of our more detailed discussion in Part I. As we argue there, the
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To understand why such characterizations about the nature of science
are inadequate, we will look now at an observation made by Willard Van
Orman Quine, a twentieth-century logician. Let H be a hypothesis and P be
one of H's predictions. A typical way of formulating the logical relationship
between H and P is using the entailment relation. Let "->" symbolize that
relation. Then we have H -> P. Suppose further that P turns out to be
false. Then by modus tollens we can derive the falsity of H. This seems
simple but is not. Representing the logical relationship between H and P as
"H -> P" is a vast oversimplification. No (interesting) hypothesis (H) ever
entails a predication (P) all by itself. Rather, any such H entails a P only
together with a large indeterminate class of other propositions, say A-i...
A-n, for some very large finite n. Thus, one should not represent the
relationship of H to P as 'H -> P.' Rather, one should represent it as '(H
& A-I & A-2,... &A-n) -> P.' If P is false, no simple modus tollens
move to H's negation is logically permissible. The only inference is that
one of the conjuncts in the antecedent of the conditional is false. Which one
should be selected as false is a matter of complex and controversial
scientific and philosophical discretion. Thus, the naive idea that scientific
hypotheses can be used to make predictions which, if false, conclusively
falsify those hypotheses cannot be sustained. As Quine puts it, "[a]ny
statement can be held true, come what may, if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system. '"205
2. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District
In Peloza a high-school biology teacher sued his school district alleging
a violation of the Establishment Clause by requiring him to teach
claim that science is guided by the principle of "methodological naturalism" can be understood in
at least two ways. On the one hand, it can be understood as the claim that "science limits itself to
the invocation of purely physical causes and explanations, although there may, in fact, be non-
physical causes and explanations for physical things and events." On the other hand, it might be
understood as the claim that "science limits itself to the invocation of purely physical causes and
explanations, and there simply are no non-physical causes or explanations of physical things and
events." On the first interpretation, the principle of methodological naturalism would not conflict
with non-physicalist explanations of life, although, as we have just argued, public-school teachers
should be normatively expected to make clear to their students that science, as these teachers
understand it, cannot exclude the possibility of there being a non-physical explanation of life. On
the second interpretation, the principle of methodological naturalism obviously conflicts with non-
physicalist explanations of life. However, as we have argued, the existence of such a conflict is,
by itself, sufficient to show that the principle of methodological naturalism, thus understood, is
itself a philosophical thesis which goes far beyond any "physically testable" boundaries that might
be defensively stipulated, thereby penetrating far into "metaphysical space." As we have also
argued, paradigmatic secular physicalists such as Dennett and Dawkins, have explicitly adopted
the second interpretation of the principle of methodological naturalism and are at this very
moment jetting around in metaphysical space jousting with theists to the death.
205. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw 43 (1961).
Barring Intelligent Design From Public Schools
"evolutionism," a religious belief system.2"6 The Court ruled against him,
arguing that evolutionism is not a religious belief system and that therefore
there was no violation of the Establishment Clause.2 °7
In the course of arguing for the proposition that "evolutionary theory" is
not a "religion," the Court said, "only if we define 'evolution' and
'evolutionism' as does Peloza as a concept that embraces the belief that the
universe came into existence without a Creator might he make out a claim.
This we need not do. 20 8
But this argument fails for the same reason that a similar argument
failed in McLean. The Court overlooked the fact that, as typically presented
in academic contexts, Darwinian evolutionary theory does incorporate the
claim that the universe came into existence without the assistance of a non-
physical cause. Once that basic point is grasped, it is obvious that
Darwinian evolutionary theory is an integrated worldview.
V. Teaching evolutionary theory in public schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause.
Our legal proposal is that the Establishment Clause should not be
deemed violated by a state statute, school-district regulation, or even just a
school-district practice, which merely permits, without requiring, public-
school science teachers to incorporate non-physicalist accounts of life in
their science classes. As we have also previously noted, this proposal is
significantly different from the types of legislation struck down in the
Court's two evolution precedents. In particular, it would neither prohibit
teaching the Darwinian theory of evolution, as in Epperson v. Arkansas, nor
would it require teaching non-physicalist theories of life whenever the
Darwinian theory is taught, as in Edwards v. Aguillard.
We shall make two arguments: first, that our proposal does not violate
the Establishment Clause, even under the Supreme Court's own evolution
cases, and second, that our proposal does not violate the Establishment
Clause under the standard of review we have proposed to resolve
Establishment Clause issues.
1. Resolution of our proposal under the Supreme Court's own evolution
precedents.
There are three crucial passages in Edwards v. Aguillard which strongly
suggest that the Court would have upheld a proposal such as ours. Selecting
just one of the passages we discussed, the Court said:
206. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d. 517 (1994).
207. 1d.
208. Id. at 521.
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We do not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not mean
that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that
the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the
history of Western Civilization... In a similar way, teaching a
variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind might
be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the
effectiveness of science instruction. But because the Creationism
Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 09
A plausible reading of such a passage yields the interpretation that the
Court has implicitly conceded the constitutionality of a statute or practice
which merely permits, without requiring, the teaching of alternative theories
of life, including non-physicalist theories.
Our argument might be contested by some who would argue that our
proposal would flounder upon the first Lemon criterion-no religious
motivations or objectives. What if it turned out that at least one of the
parties in an Establishment Clause lawsuit was a Christian and that her
motivation for participating in the litigation was based upon religious
beliefs?
We concede that this is a serious objection. Indeed, the Court seems
committed to the proposition that the mere existence of a religious
motivation for any governmental action is, by itself, sufficient to render that
action a violation of the Establishment Clause. However, there are at least
two countervailing points.
First, in none of the three Aguillard passages we singled out did the
Court hint that a proposal like ours would fail if it turned out that at least
one of the proposal's proponents had religious views, in the overly-narrow
sense of the Court's semantical interpretation of the term "religious." Why
not take the Court at its word?
Second, perhaps when directly confronted with the unreasonableness of
holding on for dear life to the first Lemon criterion, regardless of the
consequences, the Court would relax its cognitive grip just enough to
uphold the proposal.
2. Resolution of our proposal under our proposed standard of review
for applying the Establishment Clause.
Since the groundwork for this conclusion has already been worked out
209. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 594.
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previously, the argument can be stated very briefly. Recall that we have
proposed and argued for replacing the Lemon standard of review with what
we have called a "No-Discrimination standard," according to which the
Establishment Clause prohibits Government from discriminating between
integrated worldviews. Secular physicalist accounts of life are integrated
worldviews, as are non-physicalist accounts. Permitting class-room
presentation of accounts of the secularist physicalist variety, while
prohibiting class-room presentation of accounts of the non-physicalist
variety, would constitute discrimination against integrated worldviews of
the non-physicalist variety. Hence, government must permit the
presentation and exposition of integrated worldviews of the non-physicalist
variety, assuming that it permits presentation of integrated worldviews of
the secularist physicalist variety. However, if government must permit the
presentation and exposition of accounts of the non-physicalist variety, then,
a fortiori, it is constitutionally permissible for science teachers in public
schools to present accounts of the non-physicalist variety.
As we argued in Part I, there are different possible degrees of the scope
of such a governmental permission. For purposes of the statement of this
conclusion to Part II, we assume that the scope of any such governmental
permission must satisfy our No-Discrimination standard, although, as we
have also pointed out in Part I, that would not necessarily require literally
equal periods of class time. The question of what the No-Discrimination
standard requires in any specific context would be a highly contextual
matter.
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